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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to sections
78A-4-103(2)(j) of the Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Issue I:

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Mrs. Lee knew of

Dr. Williams' negligence in March of 2009 when disputed issues of fact existed about
when she learned of her injury.

A. Standard of Review: This is an appeal from Summary Judgment. The
standard of review is a non-deferential review for correctness considering all facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and considering whether
the court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed issues of
6material fact existed. Roth v. Joseph, 2010 UT App 332, iI 13,244 P.3d 391; Arnold v.
White, 2012 UT 61, iJ 11,289 P.3d 449; Gowe v. lntermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2015
(@

UT App 105, iI 3, 356 P.3d 683. Additionally, Defendants have the burden of proof to
establish that the statute of limitations bars plaintiffs claim. Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d
1361, 1363 (Utah 1996).

B. Preservation of Issue: Plaintiff properly preserved this error by
responding to the motion for summary judgment with facts indicating a dispute about this
matter (R.527-29) filing her Motion for Correction of the Record, (R.1446-59), which
motion considered (R2410-50) and ruled against by the trial court. R.2425, 2447, 245051.
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Issue II:

Were the instructions given to the jury regarding "the discovery

rule" an accurate statement of the law when the given instruction fails to comport with
both current case law and the Model Utah Jury Instruction on the issue?

A. Standard of Review: When appealing an improper jury instruction
submitted at the trial level, the standard of review is non-deferential correction of error.

State v. Dozah, 2016 UT App 13, ,r,r 12-13. Reversal is required if confidence in the jury
verdict is undermined due to the improper instruction. Turner v. University of Utah

Hospitals & Clinics, 2013 UT 52, ,r 17, 310 P .3d 1212.

B. Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved for review in the trial
court. R.2243-45.

Issue III:

Did Mrs. Lee receive a fair and impartial jury when one of the jurors

that was ultimately empaneled: (1) had a personal relationship with Defendants arid (2)
had a personal relationship with one of Defenses' witnesses?

A. Standard of Review: When appealing the fairness and impartiality of an
empaneled Jury, the standard of review is abuse of discretion regarding whether the
juror(s) at issue should have been dismissed for cause. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,r
41, 299 P .3d 892. A party is entitled to a new trial if successful in demonstrating that
challengedjuror(s) was biased as a matter of law. Turner v. University of Utah Hospitals
& Clinics, 2013 UT 52, ,r 32,310 P.3d 1212.

B. Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved for review in the trial
court. R.2649-57.
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Issue IV:
@

Did the trial court err in excluding evidence of Dr. Williams'

treatment of Mrs. Lee's pregnancy on the basis that such evidence was not relevant to the
statute of limitations portion of the bifurcated trial, when that evidence was germane to
whether and/or when Mrs. Lee knew or should have known she had sustained a "legal
injury"?
A. Standard of Review: When appealing from a lower court's ruling as to

the admissibility of evidence, the standard of review is abuse of discretion which can be
demonstrated by showing that the court relied on an erroneous conclusion of law or that
there was no evidentiary basis for the ruling. Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy,
LLC, 2009 UT 66,132,221 P.3d 256. A party must show a reasonable likelihood that a

different result would have been reached in the absence of the error. Lawrence v.
Mountainstar Healthcare, 2014 UT App 40, 1115-16, 320 P.3d 1037.
B. Preservation of Error: This issue was preserved for review in arguments
(:m

made to the trial court. R.2475-95.
Issue V.

Did the court err in failing to consider a remedy to Defense

counsel's engaging in ex parte communications with Mrs. Lee's non-party health care
provider when Utah law prohibits such communications?
A. Standard of Review: The permissibility of defense counsel's ex parte

meetings with a plaintiffs treating physicians requires interpretation of previous
decisions. Wilson v. lHC Hosp., Inc., 2012 UT 43,124,289 P.3d 369,379 (Utah 2012).
The interpretation of precedent is a question of law that is reviewed for con-ectness. Id.

3
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B. Preservation of Error: This issue was preserved for review in the trial
court. R.2744.

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code § 78B-3-404(1) provides, "A malpractice action against a health care
provider shall be commenced within two years after the plaintiff or the patient discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever
first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect, or occurrence."
Rule 47(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant part,
A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be heard
and determined by the court. The juror challenged and any other person
may be examined as a witness on the hearing of such challenge. A
challenge for cause may be taken on one or more of the following grounds.
On its own motion the court may remove a juror upon the same grounds .
. . . (6) Conduct, responses, and state of mind or other circumstances that
reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act
impartially. No person may serve as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge
is convinced the juror can and will act impartially and fairly.
Other relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the body of the brief or in the
Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is a medical malpractice case in which Plaintiff, Kylie Beddoes Lee, sued Dr.
Williams and Moab Family Medicine (hereinafter "Defendants") for failing to advise her
of the need to receive a RhoGAM shot at the appropriate time in pregnancy. Such failure
led to her becoming unnecessarily sensitized to the D-antigen. Her sensitization caused
4
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significant problems with her subsequent pregnancy and will continue to cause
~

significant problems in future pregnancies. R.1-11.
Defendants moved for summary judgment which included a statute of limitations
defense as found in Utah Code § 78B-3-404(1) on the basis that Mrs. Lee knew of or
should have discovered her injury within two years from the date of her treatment at the
hands of Defendants. R.338-59.
Mrs. Lee implicated "the discovery rule" as it related to Defendants' raising of
their statute of limitation defense and asserted that she did not discover her "legal injury''
until 2012 and that her filing of the suit was therefore timely for statutory purposes.
A trial was held and the jury ruled against Mrs. Lee on the single question
presented to them by the trial court: "Do you find that Defendants have established, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Kylie Lee knew or should have known, by
September 27, 2010, that she might have suffered an injury?" R.2288. The judgment on

~

the jury verdict was entered on February 17, 2016. R.2329-31.
Lee filed a timely notice of appeal in the trial court on March 10, 2016; and she
appeals from several decisions made by the trial court, both prior to and during trial.

Course of Proceedings
Defendants raised a statute of limitations defense pursuant to section 78B-3-404(1)
of the Utah Code, arguing that Mrs. Lee knew or should have known of her injury of
becoming sensitized to the D-antigen prior to expiration of the two-year statute and that
her claims were consequently time-barred. R.31, R.351-56. Defendants filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment on that basis and Mrs. Lee opposed the motion. The trial court
5
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denied the motion but not before ruling as a matter of law that Mrs. Lee knew Defendants
might have been negligent no later than March of 2009. Such finding was paradoxical
given that in the same Memorandum Order, the court conceded that there were "so many
hotly contested factual issues connected with the statute of limitations defense".
After the trial court denied the motion for summary judgment in regards to the
statute of limitations, but concluded that Mrs. Lee knew of Defendant's negligence in
March of 2009, Plaintiff filed a motion for correction of the record to clarify the Court's
ruling on the motion for summary judgment. R.771-72; 1346-59, 2355 et al.
A hearing was held on the Motion for Correction of the Record. R.2183, 2406 et

al. The trial court considered the motion as well as Mrs. Lee's allegations of fact.
Thereafter the trial court made a finding that Mrs. Lee knew of Dr. Williams' alleged
negligence in March of 2009 thereby essentially granting partial summary judgment for
Defendant. Id., R.2450-51. The court concluded that Mrs. Lee knew of Defendants'
alleged negligence in 2009. R.2450-51.
The trial court ultimately bifurcated the trial so that the only question to be
decided by the jury was when Mrs. Lee discovered or should have discovered "she might
be injured". R.921, 926-27, 2288. The court also denied Mrs. Lee from presenting
Defendants' medical records evidencing their treatment of Mrs. Lee during the relative
timeframe.
During jury selection, the majority of potential jurors admitted that they either: (1)
were or had been patients of the defendant Moab Family Medicine, (2) had family
members who were patients at Moab Family Medicine, or (3) knew Dr. Williams or other
6
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doctors:[TYI]/owners at the clinic Mrs. Lee was suing. Over Mrs. Lee's objection a juror
@

who should have been stricken for cause served on the jury and participated in the
verdict. R.2649-57, 2268, 2288.
The trial court ultimately bifurcated the trial so that the only question to be
decided by the jury was when Mrs. Lee discovered or should have discovered "she might
be injured". The court also prohibited Mrs. Lee from presenting Defendants' medical
records evidencing their treatment of Mrs. Lee during the relative timeframe.
Because the trial court had previously found as a matter of law that Mrs. Lee knew
of Defendants' possible negligence no later than March 2009, the only question presented
to the jury was if Mrs. Lee knew or should have known by September 27, 2010 that she
"might have suffered an injury". Mrs. Lee objected to such instruction as being an
inaccurate statement of the law. The jury answered, "Yes," and Mrs. Lee's case was
dismissed with Dr. Williams and Moab Family Medicine being awarded their costs. This

@

appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

General Background Facts
In 2008, 18 year-old Kylie[TY2] Beddoes (now Kylie Lee) became pregnant and
presented to Dr. Kenneth Williams for her first prenatal visit on June 23, 2008. R.662,
791. Dr. Williams is an employee and partner of Moab Family Medicine, P.C. R.2858.
After receiving results from a blood test conducted on Mrs. Lee, Dr. Williams recognized
that Mrs. Lee's blood tested as "Rh-negative". R.2894.

7
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To be Rh-negative means that a patient's red blood cells do not carry a particular
antigen known as the "D-antigen". R.589, 2860-2864. If an Rh-negative woman's blood
mixes with a fetus' cells that are Rh-positive, the woman's body has an antibody
response. R.2860-2866. This response is often called "sensitized to the D antigen" or "Dsensitized." Once a person is sensitized to the D antigen the person will always be
sensitized to the D antigen. R.2893-94. Mrs. Lee's sensitization to the D antigen (also
termed "Rh-sensitization" or "Rh-sensitized") 1 is the injury at issue in this case. R.289193. Rh-sensitization is an asymptomatic injury until a pregnant woman's fetus exhibits
problems from the sensitization. R.2891.
When presented with a pregnant patient who is Rh-negative (or any woman with a
negative blood type), a doctor's concern is that the developing fetus has red blood cells
that are Rh-positive. R.1549. As the fetus is developing under such conditions, if blood
from the fetus migrates into the blood stream of the mother, the mother may develop
antibodies (R. 2865) that fight the fetus' foreign blood cells. R.392. Once the mother
produces such antibodies, she is known as being "sensitized to the D antigen" (R.2866,
2892) or, said another way, Rh-sensitized. R.2865-66. Once a woman is sensitized to the
D antigen, any of the mother's fetuses are at risk of miscarriage and other potentially
devastating consequences. R.2880.

1

Throughout the record Mrs. Lee's injury was referred to as different things that mean
the same thing. The different terms used for her injury are: "D-Sensitization",
"sensitization to the D antigen", "Rh-sensitization", and "sensitized". For purposes of
simplicity Appellant will generally refer to Mrs. Lee's injury as "Rh-sensitization".
8
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Gv

To prevent a mother from becoming Rh-sensitized and to avoid injury to current
@

and future pregnancies, Doctors administer an injectable drug called RhoGAM. R.289394. The injection is to be given twice: once around the 26-week gestation mark and again
upon delivery. R.703-04, 2759. Proper administration of the drug almost always (99.8%
of the time) prevents the mother's red blood cells from producing those antibodies that
are dangerous to the fetus. R.395. In other words, the drug is intended to prevent Rhsensitization, i.e., it is prophylactic. R.2893, 2894.
In these circumstances, when a woman with an Rh-negative blood type is treated
by Dr. Williams as her primary physician it is his responsibility (R.463) to order one
injection of the drug RhoGAM during the 26 to 28 week gestation period, and then a
second injection post-partum. R.703-04, 2759. It is Mrs. Lee's position that Dr.
Williams was negligent because he did not order the first of the two RhoGAM injections.
R.007. It was undisputed that Mrs. Lee received the post-partum RhoGAM injection.

~

R.0824. However, Mrs. Lee did not receive the first injection during the 26 week time
period. R.432. She became Rh-sensitized during the pregnancy treated by Dr. Williams.
R.2894. Once a patient becomes completely sensitized and the body has already learned
to produce the antibody, RhoGAM does not cure sensitization (R.2894) becomes
completely useless as to the current and all future pregnancies. R.471, 504.

Cf

Facts related to the trial court's conclusion that Mrs. Lee knew of Dr. Williams'
alleged negligence in March of 2009.
Prior to her first pregnancy, Mrs. Lee was not sensitized to the D-antigen. R.2894.
Though Dr. Williams claims that it is "probable" that he ordered and told Mrs. Lee to get
9
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her 26 week RhoGAM shot (R.477), no such order appears in any of Dr. Williams'
records. R.469, 477. 2 Dr. Williams does not have a specific memory of ordering the 26
week RhoGAM shot for Mrs. Lee. R.464-65, 683. He also agrees that he can not say for
certain that he actually ordered the shot. R.477. On December 30, 2008, Mrs. Lee gave
birth to her first child, Chilton. R.2883, 2790. Dr. Williams' records indicate that by this
time, he suspected (R.2918, 2923) Mrs. Lee had become Rh-sensitized given he could
find no evidence of having ordered an initial RhoGAM shot, and because a blood test
indicated she had developed antibodies (yet the blood test did not say which antibodies,
and it specifically did not mention the D antigen or Rh sensitization). R.495. The same
records show that she received a post-partum RhoGAM injection nonetheless. R.736.
Mrs. Lee testified that the nurse who administered the RhoGAM shot indicated that the
shot was necessary because she was Rh-negative and that she would need the shot for all
future pregnancies. R.294 7-48. At no point does Mrs. Lee indicate she was told that she
had already become Rh-sensitized and that this injection was therefore useless.
Dr. Williams claims to have informed Mrs. Lee on December 31, 2009, that he
informed Mrs. Lee of her sensitization/injury (R.392-94); however, the record that
confirmed D sensitization was not available to Dr. Williams until January 5, 2009 when
he received the lab results. R.2925, 2918, 2931. With the exception of the discharge
summary dated January 1, 2009, Dr. Williams' records for both Mrs. Lee and her son
Chilton are absent any discussion of her sensitization/injury. R.2920. At no time is her

2

Dr. Williams admits that is was "possible" he didn't order the test because there was no
written record for the order. He was simply relying on his proclaimed habit.
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

~

sensitization referenced in her "medical history" or any other portion of Dr. Williams'
@

records that memorialized the nearly 10 visits that followed the January 5, 2009 test
result. R.2920.
The January 1, 2009, record also contains what Plaintiff believes are self-serving
misstatements by Dr. Williams. For example, the record indicated that Mrs. Lee did not
receive RhoGAM "despite having been ordered". R.714, 736. In fact, however, there

(ii)

was no evidence in the medical records that RhoGAM was ever ordered for Mrs. Lee
prior to the delivery of Chilton. Yet, this statement was redacted from the January 1
record and Plaintiff was not permitted to point out this misrepresentation to the jury.
R.2539-40. Plaintiff argued this record evidences Dr. Williams' misrepresentations in the
January I record about informing plaintiff of her injury as well as his motive to conceal
the truth from her. R.2555.
Mrs. Lee admits to researching "Rh-negative blood factors" or "RhoGAM" on the
Internet in March of2009 (about two months after Chilton's birth) and it was at that time
she first became aware that she should perhaps have had a pre-natal RhoGAM in addition
to the post-partum injection she actually received. R.2785-86. Furthermore, Mrs. Lee
was only 19 years old at the time she would have performed such "research". R.2944.
Mrs. Lee maintains that at no time prior to or after the nurse's injection was she told that

@

she had already become Rh-sensitized due to not receiving the first injection because she
would have remember being told that she was sensitized/injured. R.2778-86. Dr.
Williams testified that even if Kylie would have studied the matter on the internet, and
realized she did not receive RhoGAM during her pregnancy, she would have also
11

~
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probably learned that her likelihood of becoming sensitized in such a case was a mere
1%. R.2906-08.
Mrs. Lee again became pregnant later in 2009 and would make the incredibly
difficult decision of having an abortion. R.1453. Records from the Planned Parenthood
clinic that performed the procedure indicate that she was again tested for being Rhnegative and that staff at the facility administered a RhoGAM injection. R.520-521.
Again, however, there was nothing in the Planned Parenthood record to indicate that Mrs.
Lee knew she had already become sensitized. Id.
In early 2011, Mrs. Lee became pregnant a third time and received prenatal care
from Dr. Steven Dewey. R.2970. Mrs. Lee never gave Dr. Dewey any indication that
she knew she had an understanding of RH sensitization or the problems associated with
that, and she never said anything to him about Rh sensitization. R.2971-72, 2976-77. Dr.
Dewey stated that Mrs. Lee never mentioned her sensitization if she knew about it.
R.506. Mrs. Lee gave birth to her second child, Bryson, on December 16, 2011. R.528.
Bryson was born with complications requiring blood transfusions. R.528. It was at this
time that Mrs. Lee was informed she had developed the antibodies RhoGAM was
designed to prevent. R.528. Dr. Dewey, admitted that he thought he made an error by
failing to test Mrs. Lee for Rh-sensitization. R.504. She claims that Dr. Dewey then
informed her of her injury. R.528. Believing that Bryson's complications were due to Dr.
Dewey's neglect, Mrs. Lee sought an attorney for purposes of investigating claims
against Dr. Dewey. R.528-29. It was only after her attorney researched the matter and
discovered that Mrs. Lee had already become complete!y sensitized during her first
12
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pregnancy in 2008, that it became clear for the first time to Mrs . .Lee that: (1) she was
@

injured and (2) Dr. Williams' neglect in 2008 (not Dr. Dewey's in 2011) might have
caused the injury. R.528-29. Mrs. Lee commenced this action against Dr. Williams on
September 27, 2012. R.658.
In response to suit, Defendants' raised the affirmative defense that Mrs. Lee's
claims were untimely under the applicable two-year statute of limitations. R.23-33. Prior

~

to trial, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the matter. R.338-59. On
April 21, 2015, the court ruled against Defendants' Motion (R.762-66) but not before
finding as a matter of law that Mrs. Lee knew Dr. Williams' "might have been negligent"
in March of 2009 when she "researched" the matter on the Internet. R.763. The trial
court came to this conclusion despite also conceding that "there are so many hotly
contested factual issues connected with the statute of limitations defense ....". R. 765.
Believing to have disposed of one of the key questions of whether or not Mrs. Lee might

@

have known Dr. Williams was negligent, the court frames the remaining issue as simply
"whether Lee knew she might have been injured by the alleged negligence ...." R.763,

emphasis added. This anomalous and un-cited standard of "might have been injured"
would serve to infect the entirety of the trial up to and including the jury instruction on
the matter. R.2284.

Facts relating to the Jury Instruction
Prior to the start of the now bifurcated trial, the trial court instructed the parties to
~

submit proposed jury instructions. Over Mrs. Lee's objection that such misstated the law,
(R.2243-45), the court accepted and ultimately submitted the following instruction as it
13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

related to the Statute of Limitations and discovery rule issues: "Discovery of an injury
from medical malpractice occurs when an ordinary person through reasonable diligence
knows or should know that she might have sustained an injury.'' R.2284, emphasis added.
The ultimate question presented to the jury was: "Do you find that Defendants have
established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Kylie Lee knew or should have
known, by September 27, 2010, that she might have suffered an injury." R.2330.
(emphasis added). Mrs. Lee also objected to this ultimate question on the basis that it too

~

misstated the law. R.2284. The jury ultimately answered, "Yes" to the question.
R.2330.
Facts related to Medical Records That Suggested Dr. Williams Negligence
It was in the final paragraph of the trial court's Memorandum Opinion dated April
21, 2015, that the court first suggests that judicial economy might be served if the trial
were bifurcated, though the trial court conceded at that time that it had not determined
whether bifurcation was warranted. R.765. Apparently taking the hint, Defendants
moved for bifurcation between the Statute of Limitations defense and the ultimate
question of Defendants' negligence. R.731-39. Mrs. Lee objected on the basis that
~

judicial economy would not be served because, given the elements that must be proved
under "the discovery rule", she would necessarily have to present some evidence of
negligence at any bifurcated proceeding. R.842-4 7. The court, citing to its
Memorandum Opinion, and believing it had disposed of the need to prove whether and
when Mrs. Lee knew Dr. Williams' might have been negligent, granted bifurcation of the
trial. R.926-927. The court further refused to allow Mrs. Lee to present any evidence
14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

regarding Defendants' negligence including certain medical records that were germane to
@

whether or not Mrs. Lee knew or should have known she was "legally injured". R.2450241, 2475-95.
Specifically, Dr. Williams produced no medical records during Mrs. Lee's
pregnancy that indicated that he had ordered the 26-week RhoGAM for her.
Yet, Mrs. Lee's discharge summary from Allen Memorial Hospital dated January
1, 2009 included the following statement: She did miss her 26-week RhoGAM, which is
quite unfortunate and despite having been ordered. R.736.
Based on the trial court's ruling that no evidence of Dr. Williams' negligence
would be admitted, the parties stipulated to a version of the January 1, 2009 discharge
summary being admitted without the sentence indicating that the 26-week RhoGAM shot

@

had been ordered for Kylie. Defendants' Trail Exhibit 6. (This exhibit was not given
page number for the record on appeal but is included in the attached addendum.)
Facts related to Jury Selection
During jury selection, a majority of the jury panel had a relationship with the
Williams' and the Moab Family Clinic, either as patients themselves or concerning
family members. R.2580-680. Juror #26, K.H., admitted to knowing nurse C.W. through
scouting activities R.2652. Juror 26's wife had been a patient of Dr. Williams' wife at
Moab Family Medicine. R.2652-53. Lee challenged K.H. (#26) for cause because of the
relationship he and his wife had with the Williams and the clinic, and because he had a
Ci

relationship with witness Nurse C.W. and her son. R.2652-53. The trial court denied the
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motion to strike and K.H. sat on the jury. R.2268, 2657. Plaintiff used all of her
peremptory challenges during jury selection. R.2268.
Facts related to Ex-Parte Communication

Nurse C.W., one of Defendants' non-party witnesses R.2655, treated Plaintiff
during and after her pregnancy at issue. R.2655. During Defendants' direct examination
of Nurse C. W., Plaintiffs counsel noticed that the testimony sounded unusually well
"rehearsed". R.2724. Suspicious, Plaintiffs counsel requested to take the witness on
voir dire to inquire whether this witness had improper ex parte communications with

defense counsel prior to trial. Id. Upon examination, nurse C. W. admitted to speaking
with defense counsel the night prior to trial (R.2740) and without the presence of
Plaintiffs counsel. R.2740-43. The witness further admitted that it was defense counsel
who called her. R.2740-43. Although Nurse C.W. denied discussing Plaintiffs medical
treatments or records (R.2743), she admitted to discussing her testimony with
Defendants' counsel ex parte. R.2740-2743.
Plaintiff objected to Nurse C.W's testimony generally citing Barbuto and Wilson
which prohibit such communications. R.2724. Plaintiff then requested that the witness
be struck. R.2724. The trial court, after conducting no research on the validity of
Plaintiffs objections, denied Plaintiffs objection and stated "[y]ou're so far of the
reservation with this argument I'm not even going to listen to it. It can't possibly be the
law that she can't testify about the doctor's habit because she has at one point treated the
plaintiff." R.2744. Plaintiff clarified that it was not that the witness could not testify, but
that Nurse C.W. had had ex parte communication with Defendants' counsel without Mrs.
16
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Lee's knowledge and consent. R.2744. However, the Court refused to find any
~

impropriety despite the communications being patently illegal. R.2744-45. The trial
court concluded, "you are so far away from that there that I don't know why we're even
spending time on it." R.2744-45.
Nurse C.W. testified that she had heard Defendant Williams thoroughly explain
injuries to other patients inferring that he must have done so with Plaintiff. R.2746-47.
Plaintiff believes that Nurse C. W's character testimony played a significant role in the
jury's determination about whether to believe that Dr. Williams informed Plaintiff of her
injury prior to September of 2010 arguably triggering the statute of limitations. 3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court's legal conclusion that Mrs. Lee Knew of Dr. Williams' negligence in
March of 2009.

The trial court concluded as a matter of law that Plaintiff knew of Dr. Williams'
@

alleged negligence in March of 2009. However, the trial court ignored genuine issues of
material fact disputing when Plaintiff actually learned of Dr. Williams' negligence.
Evidence was presented that Plaintiff learned of her injury and Dr. Williams' alleged
negligence in 2012 after the delivery of her second son.
Additionally, it was legally impossible for plaintiff to have discovered Dr.
Williams' alleged negligence before Mrs. Lee knew or should have she was injured.

3

Although juror bias is addressed in another argument in this brief, juror 26, K.H.,
admitted knowing Nurse C.W. and meeting her through their children's scouting
activities which Plaintiff believes adds to the prejudice of not granting a sanction after
Nurse C. W. 's ex parte communications with Defense counsel.
17
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Thus, because there were questions of fact about when Mrs. Lee learned of her injury,
and because Mrs. Lee presented evidence that there was a second event which she
believed could have caused her injury, there necessarily were questions of fact about
when (1) when Mrs. Lee learned she was Rh-sensitized/injured; (2) when Mrs. Lee
discovered Dr. Williams' negligence/fault as well as (3) when she learned which event
caused her injury.

Jury Instruction Issue
The jury instruction used by the court stated that the applicable standard in
determining when the statute of limitations is triggered was simply whether plaintiff
knew or should have known that she "might have sustained an injury". Such instruction
was in error for two reasons. First, case law repeatedly states that a plaintiff must have
knowledge of a tangible and actual injury-not a possible or even probable injury. By
using the phrase "might be injured", the court implied to the jury that knowledge of a
possible injury is sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations. In this case, while there
was evidence suggesting Mrs. Lee may have known of legal injury as far back as March
of 2009, there was evidence that Mrs. Lee did not learn of her actual and manifest injury
until after the birth of her second child. Had the jury deliberated under the proper
instruction, it is highly likely they would have come to a different conclusion on the
statute of limitations issue.
Second, the jury instruction and ultimate question failed to include two additional
and required f?lements that ( 1) the plaintiff know or should know both the cause of the
injury as well as (2) the possibility of the provider's fault in causing the injury. The
18
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~

court's failure was obvious error given the fact that proving each and every element
Gi

under the rule, by preponderance of the evidence, was the Defendants' burden. Therefore
the court improperly absolved the defense from having to meet their burden of proof as to
all three elements and confidence in the verdict is undermined due to the improper
instruction and jury question.
Jury Selection Issue
Mrs. Lee asserts she was denied her right to a fair and impartial jury. She
challenged a juror for cause due to an existing relationship he had with the Defendants
and with a defense witness that was disclosed during voir dire. These relationships
created a presumption of partiality/bias that required the juror be stricken for cause unless
further investigation by the court revealed evidence to rebut that inference. Here, the trial
court failed to so investigate and thus failed to insure a fair trial for Lee. Accordingly, he
abused his discretion and a new trial is required.
Evidence Admission Issue
Prior to trial, Mrs. Lee opposed Defendants' Motion in limine seeking to exclude
evidence that tended to disprove Dr. Williams' assertion that he informed Mrs. Lee of her
injury on December 31, 2008, thus beginning the limitations period. The first such
evidence was a "Discharge Summary" apparently generated on that date, in which Dr.
Williams states in part:

~

I reviewed my standard postpartum teaching. She is Rh negative with
positive antibody screen. We discussed the potential for future
miscarriages due to her positive antibody screen. She did receive a
RhoGAM. As noted her fetal blood screen was negative. She did miss her
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26-week RhoGAM. which is quite unfortunate and despite having been
ordered.
(emphasis added). The court however, only allowed Plaintiff to introduce this record

with the emphasized portion redacted.
The second piece of evidence Plaintiff was prevented to introduce was. Dr.
Williams' own admission that nowhere in any of his treatment records was such an order
found. Thus, Dr. Williams' admissions directly contradicted the redacted statement.
This contradiction calls into dispute not only whether Dr. Williams ever ordered the
prenatal RhoGAM shot as he indicated in the full text of the "Discharge Summary", but
more importantly to the statute of limitations question, whether Dr. Williams' was being
truthful when he claims to have informed Mrs. Lee of her injury on December 31, 2008.
Plaintiff believes had this evidence been introduced, the jury would likely have inferred:
(1) Dr. Williams was attempting to conceal his negligence when he created the January 1
record; and (2) that he did not inform Mrs. Lee of her injury that day.
Ex Parte Communication Issue

Defense counsel met with a non-party treating health care provider of Mrs. Lee
prior to calling that provider as a witness at trial. This ex parte meeting violated the
healthcare fiduciary duty of confidentiality to Mrs. Lee and breached her right to privacy.
Furthermore, it violated Utah law under prior appellate decisions. The trial court refused
to see this violation and refused to hold an appropriate hearing on this issue. The trial
court's failure to act resulted in a continued breach of privacy to Lee, prejudiced her at
trial, and accordingly, requires a sanction or remedy for this violation by defense counsel.
20
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~

The only reasonable and appropriate remedy at this stage is a new trial followed by
01

remand and further hearing on the matter.
ARGUMENT

I. The trial court erred in concluding that Mrs. Lee Knew of Dr. Williams'
negligence in March of 2009.

a. There were genuine issues of fact about when Mrs. Lee learned of Dr.
Williams Negligence/Fault.
The trial court denied Defendants motion for summary judgment in regards to the
statute oflimitation. R.762-65, 771-72. At the close of arguments on the summary
judgment motion the trial court stated, "I really thought it would be clear to me at the end
of our argument whether, what I should do. It's still not clear. I'll read these cases to see
if I can come up with a decision ... but I just think it's a very gnarly issue, so I'll do the
best I can with it." R.2397. This sentiment was echoed in the written ruling, stating in
GJ

part, "there are so many hotly contested factual issues connected with the statute of
limitations defense." R. 765. Nonetheless, the trial court after further consideration and
argument by the parties interpreted his ruling to be that Lee has "admitted that in March
of 2009, she did this research, and I have said in my ruling clearly, she knew he might
have been negligent at that point." R.2425.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "(I) 'there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact' and (2) 'the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw."'
Poteet v. White, 147 P.3d 439,441 (Utah 2006). Since the Court does not resolve issues

of fact, it must "consider the record as a whole," viewing "all facts and fair inferences
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~

drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. In ruling
on a motion for summary judgment, a trial court may consider, together with the
affidavits filed, the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Guardian State Bank v. Humphe,ys, 762 P.2d 1084, 1087
~

(Utah 1988).
Under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, "a patient has discovered her injury
only when she has discovered her 'legal injury-that is, both the fact of injury and that it
resulted from negligence."' Arnold v. White, 2012 UT 61,115,289 P.3d 449 (quoting
Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, ill, 221 P.3d 256); see also
Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996) ("the two-year limitations period
does not commence to run until the injured person knew or should have known that he
sustained an injury and that the injury was caused by negligent action"); and Foil v.
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979) (We "hold that the term discovery of 'injury' ...
means discovery of injury and the negligence which resulted in the injury."). This
discovery of the legal injury occurs "'when a plaintiff first has actual or constructive
knowledge of the relevant facts forming the basis of the cause of action.' Accordingly ...
without more, neither ( 1) the existence of symptoms, (2) a suspicion that a doctor's
negligence caused medical complication, nor (3) the commencement of an investigation
is sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations." Id. at ill 6 (quoting Russell Packard
Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, il22, 108 P.3d 741).
Of critical importance here is this third factor. In his initial ruling on summary
judgment the trial court denied the Defendants motion for summary judgment as to the
22
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statute oflimitations. R.762-65. In that ruling, the trial court properly set forth some of
the disputed facts present as to the discovery of Mrs. Lee's legal injury. Yet when
confusion arose, he subsequently interpreted his ruling to be that because Lee "admitted
that in March of 2009 she did this [internet] research" on RhoGAM, she, therefore,
"knew [Williams] might have been negligent at that point." R.2450-51. This conclusion
effectively partially granted the defense motion for summary judgment. Mrs. Lee asserts
the trial court erred in this second ruling.
Mrs. Lee asserts that her simple internet research was done only to satisfy
curiosity about the RhoGAM shot the nurse administered after Chilton's birth. R.147071. Mrs. Lee asserts that it does not even rise to the level of "the commencement of
investigation" discussed by the Utah Supreme Court in Arnold. Nonetheless, even if it is
investigative, this sole act-as relied upon the trial court-is insufficient to trigger the
statute of limitations. One, because at the time this research was done, Lee claims she
~

did not know she had an injury. Two, "a plaintiffs initiation of an investigation to
determine whether her injury was the result of negligence is insufficient to trigger the
statute of limitations. Such an investigation, by its nature, indicates that the plaintiff has
not yet discovered that her 'injury ... resulted from negligence,' and has thus not yet
discovered her legal injury." Arnold, 2012 UT12 at ,I20 (quoting Daniels, 2009 UT 66,
,II, 221 P.3d 256).
Moreover, this Court should consider all the facts and those facts do not support
the trial court's ultimate ruling on summary judgment in regards to the statute of
limitations.
23
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Here, Mrs. Lee claims that it was not until after a pregnancy in 2011-2012, and a
similar subsequent event (a physician's failure to order RhoGAM) that she learned of her
Rh-sensitization/injury. R.527-29.
Dr. Williams is alleged to have negligently failed to order a prenatal RhoGAM
shot for Plaintiff in 2008 during his treatment of Mrs. Lee's first pregnancy. R.001-008.
Similarly, Mrs. Lee's treating physician for a subsequent pregnancy, Dr. Dewey,
admitted that he thought he made a mistake by failing to order the blood screen which
would have resulted in Mrs. Lee receiving a RhoGAM. R.504. Mrs. Lee claims that she
first learned she was injured after a conversation with Dr. Dewey in 2012. R.527-29.
Mrs. Lee originally thought it was Dr. Dewey's failure to order RhoGAM that caused her
Rh-sensitization/injury. R.527-29. However, she learned of Dr. Williams' negligence in
2012 after she hired counsel, counsel collected Dr. Williams' records, and counsel
informed her that it was Dr. William's negligence that caused her Rh-sensitization/injury.
Id.

Drawing all inferences in a light most favorable to Mrs. Lee, the non-moving
party, the jury could have determined that Mrs. Lee did not learn of Dr. Williams
negligence/fault until 2012. Therefore, the trial court erred when it did not conclude that
there were issues of fact about when Plaintiff learned of Dr. Williams' negligence/fault.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment. This is
true because as set forth in his initial ruling, there are genuine issues of material facts as
to Mrs. Lee's discovery of her legal injury, which was negligence and the injury. It was
likewise error for the trial court to rely only on Mrs. Lee's minimal internet research to
24
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determine her knowledge of negligence for purposes of the statute of limitations because
{j

this "investigation" without more is insufficient.
b. It was legally impossible for Mrs.- Lee to have known of Dr. Williams
negligence/fault if there were questions of fact about when she learned of her

~

m1ury.
As mentioned above, Mrs. Lee claimed that she believed it was Dr. Dewey's
negligence in December of 2011 that caused her sensitization until her attorneys received
Dr. Williams' records in 2012. R.527-29. Mrs. Lee could not be charged with knowledge
of negligence until she knew which of two negligent events, (Williams' negligence in
2008 or Dewey's negligence in 2011), caused her injury. The Utah Supreme Court
recognized that when either of two negligent events could have caused an injury, only
when the plaintiff knows which negligent event caused the injury is the plaintiff charged
with having knowledge of negligence sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations.
@

Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, ,r 27, 221 P .3d 256 (a patient
cannot know "the negligence which resulted in injury" without knowing what medical
treatment or procedure caused his injury). Thus, a plaintiff cannot have knowledge of

~

negligence (termed "fault" in M.U.J.I. 2nd CV 325) until the plaintiff knows of her
injury, and knows or should know which of the two negligent acts might have caused the
~

lllJUry.

In this case, there were two separate negligent acts that could have caused the
same injury. Furthermore, Mrs. Lee claims that she did not know of the actual injury
until her subsequent doctor informed her of her Rh-negative sensitivity in 2012. R.52725
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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29. Whether she was objectively reasonable in realizing her injury at that time is a
question of fact for the jury.
Therefore, the conclusion by the trial court that Mrs. Lee had knowledge of
negligence in March of 2009, without ignoring the events surrounding the subsequent
negligent act and the objective reasonableness of Mrs. Lee claiming she first became
aware of her injury at that subsequent time, was erroneous.
For the foregoing reasons, Mrs. Lee requests a reversal on the grounds that he trial
court improperly granted summary judgment on the issue of when she learned of Dr.
Williams' negligence/fault.

II. The trial court's jury instruction on the issue of when Mrs. Lee should have
"discovered" her injury was erroneous because it failed to comport with all current
case law on the matter.
The instruction on the "discovery rule" used by the trial court was "[ d]iscovery of
an injury from medical malpractice occurs when an ordinary person through reasonable
diligence kn~ws or should know that she might have sustained an injury". R.3007-09,

emphasis added. The ultimate question on the verdict form was "[d]o you find that
Defendants have established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Kylie Lee knew or
should have known, by September 27, 2010, that she might have suffered an injury".
R.2284, emphasis added. This standard as articulated in the instruction and as
incorporated in the ultimate question is legally deficient for two reasons. First, it
impermissibly lowers the degree of knowledge of an actual injury required to trigger the
statute of limitations. Second, it wholly fails to include the requirement that a plaintiff
26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

must know or should know of (I) a negligent act and (2) that the negligent act might have
~

caused the actual injury.

a.

"Might be injured" is a legally impermissible standard for purposes of
the "discovery rule".

For purposes of the discovery rule as it relates to a statute of limitations defense, a
patient has discovered her injury only when she has discovered her "legal injury"-that
is, both the fact of injury and that it resulted from negligence. Arnold v. White, 2012 UT
61, iJ 15, 289 P.3d 449,. (emphasis original). The Model Utah Jury Instruction on this
very question states as follows:
[Name of plaintiff] must file a medical malpractice claim within two years
from the date [she] discovered the injury or the claim is barred. You must
decide the date by which [name of plaintiff] should have discovered the
lllJUry.

"Discovery" of an injury from medical malpractice occurs when a patient
knows or through reasonable diligence should know each of the following:
~

(1) that [she] sustained an injury;
(2) the cause of the injury; and
(3) the possibility of a health care provider's fault in causing the injury.

~

M.U.J.I. 2nd CV 325.
This model jury instruction incorporates the most recent case law on the matter.
The very first element to be determined is whether or not a patient has "sustained an
injury." It is not until the patient knows or should know of an actual injury that she can
even determine whether there was negligence at the hands of the doctor and whether such
negligence might have caused that injury. Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah
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1996). Furthermore the injury must be made "manifest" and it is not enough that there
exists a possibility or even a probability of harm. Id. at 1364.
Under the discovery rule, it is the knowledge of injury which triggers the statute,
not notice ofprobable or possible injwy. Id. at 1365, emphasis added. As the rule is
incorporated in the Model Utah Jury Instruction, the first element to be determined is
simply whether or not the patient knew or should have known "that she sustained an
injury." There is no speculative modifier contained in this element, i.e. "might". Such
wording in the first element is legally sensible given the case law to which the Model
Instruction cites indicates the injury must be "actual" and "manifest"-not speculative or
even probable. Id. Finally, this is the more appropriate standard because tolling the
statute of limitations until the potential harm actually manifests itself allows for more
certain proof and fewer speculative lawsuits. Id.
In this case, the trial court submitted instructions and questions to the jury that fail
to comport with this applicable law. Specifically, in using the phrase "might have
sustained an injury"(R.2284), the court invited the jury to improperly consider that Mrs.
Lee might have thought her injury was possible well before it was actual and manifest.
This necessarily results in an improper application of the discovery rule to the facts of the
case. In this case, the injury was not manifest until after the birth of her second child in
2011, who was born with substantial medical problems due to Mrs. Lee's then unknown
and up to that point un-manifest sensitization. Had they deliberated over the proper
question, certainly the jury may not have concluded she knew of her injury in 2010prior to her second delivery. Therefore, reversal is required given that there can be no
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confidence in the jury verdict because the verdict is undermined due to the improper
<@

instruction. Turner v. University of Utah Hospitals & Clinics, 2013 UT 52, ,I 17,310 P.3d
1212.

b.

The jury instruction fails because it wholly omits additional required
elements.

The jury instruction as presented in M.U.J.I. 2nd CV 325, not only requires a
plaintiff know or should know that she "sustained an injury" to trigger limitations, but
that the plaintiff also know or should know both the cause of the injury as well as the
possibility of the provider's fault in causing the injury. M.U.J.I. 2nd CV 325. In this
case, the court wholly failed to include these additional required elements. R.2284. This
was obvious error given the fact that proving each and every element under the rule, by
preponderance of the evidence, was the Defendants' burden. Therefore the trial court
improperly absolved the defense from having to meet their burden of proof as to all three
elements and confidence in the verdict is again undennined due to the improper
instruction.
@

III. Mrs. Lee did not receive a fair and impartial jury because the trial court
refused to strike a iuror who had a personal relationship with the defendants and
with a defense witness.
Mrs. Lee asserts that she was denied her right to a fair and impartial jury.
West v. Holley, 2004 UT 35, ,Il2, 103 P.3d 708. The standard of review regarding

whether a juror should be dis1nissed for cause is abuse of discretion. State v. Maestas,
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2012 UT 46, ,141, 299 P.3d 892. A party is entitled to a new trial by demonstrating that a
challenged juror was biased. Turner v. University of Utah Hospitals & Clinics, 2013 UT
52, 132, 310 P .3d 1212. And while trial courts are afforded "considerable discretion in
ruling on motions to dismiss jurors for cause, we have encouraged them to err on the side
of dismissing questionable jurors. Dismissing questionable jurors before trial makes
practical sense because replacement jurors are readily available." West, 2004 UT 35, 112
(citing State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ,151, 992 P.2d 951). Furthermore, "A trial court's
discretion in ruling on challenges to a juror for cause is limited by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and our case law." Id. at ,114. 4
In Turner, the Utah Supreme Court abandoned the "cure-or-waive rule." 2013 UT
52 at ,125. Instead the Court adopted the following: "[P]arties need not use all of their
challenges on jurors who were previously challenged for cause in order to preserve the
issue of jury bias for appeal. Rather, as long as (a) all of the party's peremptory
challenges were used and (b) a juror who was previously challenged for cause ends up
being seated on the jury, the issue of juror bias has been preserved." Id. at 132.
Here, this issue is preserved because all of Mrs. Lee's peremptory challenges were
used and a challenged juror, K.H. (#26), was seated on the jury and participated in the
verdict. R.2268, 2288, 3157. Moreover, Mrs. Lee is entitled to a new trial because K.H.
should have been excused from the panel because of partiality or bias.
4

Rule 47(f)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that jurors should be removed
for cause when "conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances ... reasonably
lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially. No person may serve
as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge is convinced the juror can and will act
impartially and fairly."
30
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~

Several facts disclosed by K.H. in the questionnaire and during voir dire
~

demonstrated partiality and/or bias. One, K.H.'s wife had been a patient of Defendant
Dr. Williams. R.2653. Two, he had been a patient at Defendant Moab Family Medicine.
R.2652-53. Three, he has been familiar with Dr. Williams and his wife since they opened

{jj

their clinic (R.2653); which approximately 15 years at the time of trial. R.2857. Fourth,
and most important, he worked in scouting with the son of C.W., who as a nurse that
treated Mrs. Lee during the delivery of her first child and who testified at trial for the
defense. R.2652, 2655. Juror K.H. stated during voir dire that "I know her [because] her
son was involved in a scouting program we had." R.2652.
While he indicated in voir dire that he would not be affected by his experience
with nurse C. W. and her family, it was error for the court to simply accept that assurance
~

rather than to strike him for cause or to conduct the further inquiry required by Utah law.
The facts surrounding this juror's history with the parties and a defense witness required
his exclusion from the jury panel.
In West v. Holley, 2004 UT 97, ,I 14, 103 P.3d 708, the Utah Supreme Court
indicated that once statements are made during the jury selection process that facially
raise a question of partiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion occurs unless the
challenged juror is removed by the court or unless the court or counsel investigates
further and finds the inference rebutted (quoting State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ,I27, 24 P.3d
948). "Voir dire responses revealing evidence of bias or partiality give rise to a
presumption that a potential juror is biased, and the juror must be dismissed unless that
presumption is rebutted." Id. at if 14. Additionally, "The Utah Supreme Court has
31
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instructed 'trial judges to take care to adequately and completely probe jurors on all
possible issues of bias."' Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, ~12, 71 P .3d 60 I
(quoting State v. James, 819 P.2 781, 798 (Utah 1991)).
Moreover, "under our case law ... a presumption of bias cannot be rebutted solely
by a juror's bare assurance of her own impartiality because a challenged juror cannot
reasonably be expected to judge her own fitness to serve." Id. at ~15 (citations omitted).
Furthermore, the trial court, in refusing to strike for cause, may not rely solely on the
juror's own view that he can judge the evidence fairly. Rather, the trial comt must
identify some other basis for overcoming the presumption of bias. Id. at ~ 17.
What happened here in regards to K.H. is exactly what the Utah Supreme Court
indicated in West should not happen. Factual statements were made during the selection
process that facially raised a multitude of questions or partiality or prejudice concerning
relationships with the defendants and a defense witness. "A juror, who through a
personal association with a witness or a party has developed a relationship of affection,
respect, or esteem, cannot be deemed disinterested, indifferent, or impartial." Butterfield
v. Sevier Valley Hospital, 2010 UT App 357, ~21, 246 P.3d 120 (quoting State v. Cox,

826 P.2d 656,660 (Utah App. 1992) and State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah
1977)); see also State v. Callihan, 2002 UT 86, ~~47-59, 55 P.3d 573 (trial court
properly excused two jurors sua sponte where their statements raised inferences of bias
that were not properly rebutted by subsequent statements and they had personal
relationships with the parties or the witnesses). Such a prospective juror must be
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~

disqualified unless there is an adequate probe by the trial court concerning the potential
@

bias and sufficient evidence is received that the juror will act impartially. Id.
However, all the trial court did was to bring K.H. back into the courtroom and ask
him: "[W]ould you be affected if [Nurse C.W.] testifies as a witness in this case? Would
you be affected by your experience with her son in the scouting program?" R.2656. When
K.H. replied "No," the court stated, "Come back at 1:30. I've determined that I accept
his answers and I'm convinced he would be impartial." R.2656-57.
That was it. There was no further investigation by the trial court and there was no
inferential rebuttal. There was only a reliance on the juror's own view of impartiality
based upon one question from the court. Put simply, there was no identification by the
trial court or by the defense to overcome the presumption of partiality and/or bias that
facially existed due to the relationship between K.H. and the defendants and a defense
witness. The lack of follow-up or follow-through by the trial court is particularly

@

disturbing considering the recognition by the court that "[i]n this case jurors are going to
be required to determine what they believe the truth to be about something that both Dr.
Williams and Kylie Lee will testify about and their testimony will be contradictory."
R.2650. 5
Mrs. Lee asserts that this is yet another example of what the Utah Supreme Court
has characterized as a "stark little exercise" which is "the all too prevalent practice of

5

,:..~
~

Counsel for the defense argued against striking K.H. because "the scouting experience
was with [C.W.] and not with the Williams." R.2656. As will be detailed further in the
next argument, C.W. was involved in Lee's care during the delivery of her first child and
her testimony was critical to that credibility assessment.
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avoiding any real inquiry into possible bias by a trial judge's asking a prospective juror if
he or she could decide the case fairly and follow the law ... and then taking a prospective
juror's affirmative answer as dispositive of the issue." Depew, 2003 UT App at ~26
(citing and quoting State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ~34, 992 P.2d 951, and State v.
Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988)). Additionally, here the trial court failed even
to seek any information whatsoever concerning C.W.'s anticipated test~mony. The trial
court did nothing but accept K.H. 's affirmative answer to his "stark little" question of
"can you not be affected by your relationships to the defendant(s) and defense witness
and be fair." There was no probing of the juror or defense counsel concerning the
relationships (particularly .concerning the witness) nor was there any other basis
established by the trial court that could overcome the presumption of partiality/bias of
Gv

K.H. as required by Utah law.
It is the "trial court's responsibility to seat an impartial jury." State v. Callihan,
2002 UT 86, ~57, 55 P.3d 573. Yet, that did not happen here. The voir dire responses by
K.H. revealed evidence of bias or partiality. He should have been dismissed unless that
presumption of disqualification was rebutted. It was not-in fact, no effort was made by
the trial counsel to do so. Accordingly, "an abuse of discretion occurred" because K.H.
was not removed. West, 2004 UT 35 at ~14. 6 Accordingly, Mrs. Lee asks that this Court

6

Similar problems also existed with juror, M.H. However, he ended up as the alternate
juror and was sent home prior to deliberation. R.2987, 3036. M.H. was a patient of
another doctor at the clinic and he was friends with an additional clinic doctor. R.2676,
77. He was challenged for cause. R.2679. When asked if he would feel uncomfortable in
the future around his doctor, he replied, "I don't know. I mean, would they know I'm on
the jury? I don't-I don't know .... I hope he's a professional and he'll be treating me as
34
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

conclude that she is entitled to a new trial because she was denied her right to an
@

impartial jury.

IV. The trial court erred by not allowing Plaintiff to introduce evidence that called
into question Dr. Williams' truthfulness about whether he actually informed Mrs.
Lee of her injurv on December 31, 2008 thus beginning the Limitations period.
Prior to trial, Plaintiff opposed Defendants' Motion in limine seeking to exclude
evidence that tended to disprove Dr. Williams' assertion that he infonned Mrs. Lee of her
injury on December 31, 2008, thus beginning the limitations period. R.1863-71. The first
such evidence was a "Discharge Summary" apparently generated the day after (January
1, 2009) Dr. Williams allegedly informed Mrs. Lee of her injury, in which Dr. Williams
states in part:
I reviewed my standard postpartum teaching. She is Rh negative with
positive antibody screen. We discussed the potential for future
miscarriages due to her positive antibody screen. She did receive a
RhoGAM. As noted her fetal blood screen was negative. She did miss her
26-week RhoGAM which is quite unfortunate and despite having been
ordered.
R. 736, emphasis added. The court however, only allowed the parties to introduce this
record with the emphasized portion redacted. R.2539-40.

@

anybody else ... " R.2678-79. He was challenged for cause. R.2679. The trial court denied
the motion, stating, "I'm convinced he would be impartial based on his answers. I just
note that if we're going to excuse people who are patients of that practice, I think we'll
go all the way through [#]40 without finding anyone except possibly [#]38. So I'm going
to qualify him and that gets us our 17. So you can tell them that [#] 3 5 and up are
excused .... " R.2680.
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The second piece of evidence Plaintiff was prevented to introduce was. Dr.
Williams' own admission that nowhere in any of his treatment records was such an order
for RhoGAM. R.464-65, 468-70, 476-78. Thus, Dr. Williams' admissions directly
contradicted the redacted statement. This contradiction calls into dispute not only
whether Dr. Williams ever ordered the prenatal RhoGAM shot as he indicated in the full
text of the "Discharge Summary", but more importantly to the statute oflimitations
question, whether Dr. Williams' was being truthful when he claims to have informed
Mrs. Lee of her injury on December 31, 2009. R.2879. Plaintiff believes had this
evidence been introduced, the jury could rightfully have inferred: (1) Dr. Williams was
attempting to conceal his negligence/fault when he created the January 1 record; and (2)
that he did not inform Mrs. Lee of her injury.
The only other testimony Defendants offered to suggest Mrs. Lee knew, or should
of known of her injury, was Dr. Williams statement that he thinks he had other
conversations with Mrs. Lee about her sensitization (though he could not recall the
specifics of those conversations). R.2886-86. Plaintiff elicited testimony that suggested
Dr. Williams never had further conversations with Mrs. Lee because (1) Dr. Williams'
records were absent any mention of Mrs. Lee's injury/sensitization after 01/01/09
R.2920; and (2) the test result showing Mrs. Lee's Rh-sensitization/injury was not
available to Dr. Williams until 0 1/05/09 (R.2920)-four days after Dr. Williams
allegedly told Mrs. Lee about her injury/sensitization. Thus, admission of an underacted
portion of the January 1, 2009 record was critical.
In reviewing questions of admissibility of evidence at trial, Utah courts employ
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two standards of review. State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah App.), cert. denied,
@

857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). With respect to the trial court's selection, interpretation, and
application of a particular rule of evidence, case law requires the application of a
correction of error standard. Id. (citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1268-72 (Utah
1993)). When the rule of evidence requires the trial court to balance specified factors to
detennine admissibility, "abuse of discretion or reasonability is the appropriate standard."
Id. (citing Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270 n.11). Further, even where error is found, reversal

is appropriate only in those cases where, after review of all of the evidence presented at
trial, it appears that "'absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different
result would have been reached."' Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 7 52 P .2d

B 17, 1319 (Utah App.

1988) {quoting State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 189 (Utah 1988)); see also Joseph v. W.H.
Groves Latter Day Saints Hosp., 7 Utah 2d 39, 44,318 P.2d 330,333 (1957); Utah Dep't
ofTransp. v. 6200 S. Assocs., 872 P.2d 462,465 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

With respect to this case and Plaintiffs attempt to introduce the above-mentioned
evidence, the court disallowed admission on the basis that it was not relevant to the
statute oflimitations issue in the now bifurcated trial. R.2475-95. However, this
evidence was very much relevant to whether or when Dr. Williams in fact told Mrs. Lee
of her injury on December 31, 2008 as he alleged at trial. It was and continues to be Mrs.
Lee's theory that upon his realization that he did not, in fact, order the prenatal RhoGAM
shot, and that he suspected Mrs. Lee had become Rh-sensitized during the pregnancy,
that Dr. Williams created the self-serving account in the "Discharge Summary" of a
conversation that never actually took place. Because the trial court did not allow Plaintiff
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to impeach the veracity of Dr. Williams' assertion that he told Mrs. Lee of her injury on
December 31 by pointing out the discrepancies between the redacted document and Dr.
Williams' s own admission, the jury was left with the mis impression that the "Discharge
Summary" simply corroborated Dr. Williams' testimony of having such conversation
~

with Mrs. Lee.
Furthermore, Dr. Williams would have had a motive to conceal the truth about
him being the cause of Mrs. Lee's sensitization. Said another way, the apparent
misstatement in the Discharge Summary that the 26-week RhoGAM was ordered during
the pregnancy evidenced Dr. Williams' motive to conceal his mistake in failing to order
RhoGAM. Citing to Ut.R. Evid. 608(c), which states "Bias, prejudice or any motive to
misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness
or by other evidence", Mrs. Lee further attempted to have this evidence admitted on the
basis of showing such motive. The court however continued to deny introduction of the
evidence as requested. R.1939-40, 2556-57.
Because the evidence at issue was indeed relevant to both (1) whether and/or when
Mrs. Lee became aware of her injury, and (2) whether Dr. Williams may have had motive
to misrepresent that he told her of her injury on December 31, 2008, the court erred in not
allowing the admission. Had such evidence been introduced and had Plaintiff been
allowed to examine Dr. Williams on these issues, a different result is likely in this case.
Without full context for the "Discharge Summary'' as could have been established
through use of other medical records and Dr. Williams admission that no order for
RhoGAM appeared in his records, the jury was left believing that the "Discharge
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Summary" was simply a written confirmation of Dr. Williams' alleged December 31,
@

2009, conversation wherein he claims to have told Mrs. Lee about her injury.
V. The trail court erred in failing to consider a remedy for admitted ex parte
communication between defense counsel and one of Mrs. Lee's non-party treating
"physicians" because such communications are wholly improper under current case
law and such impropriety demands a remedy.

Mrs. Lee asserts that defense counsel breached her duty relative to a third party
nurse's healthcare fiduciary duty of confidentiality to Mrs. Lee by engaging in an ex
@

parte meeting with the nurse. That conversation breached Mrs. Lee's right to privacy,

prejudiced her at trial, and requires an appropriate sanction. Mrs. Lee, therefore, asks this
Court to grant her a new trial and to remand this matter to the trial court with instruction
to consider an appropriate remedy.
Regarding the standard of review, "[t]he permissibility of defense counsel's ex
@

parte meetings with a plaintiffs treating physicians requires interpretation of previous

decisions. And the interpretation of precedent is a question of law that is reviewed for
c01Tectness." Wilson v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 2012 UT 43,124,289 P.3d 369,379 (other
Cib

citations omitted).
A physician is bound by both a duty to preserve the physician-patient testimonial
privilege and a healthcare fiduciary duty of confidentiality. Wilson, 2012 UT 43 at 184.
The physician-patient testimonial privilege is restricted to court proceedings, while the
duty of confidentiality "serves a broader purpose." Id. Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence establishes the physician-patient privilege. Id. It grants patients a privilege for
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communications with their physician that relate to "diagnoses made, treatment provided,
or advice given by the physician." Id. But the patient-physician privilege is not absolute.
No privilege exists when the "communications are relevant to an issue of the physical,
mental , or emotional condition of the patient ... in any proceeding in which that condition
is an element of any claim or defense." Id.
In contrast, a physician's duty of confidentiality encompasses the broad principle
that prohibits a physician from disclosing information received through the physicianpatient relationship. The duty requires a physician to notify the patient prior to disclosing
confidential records or communications in a subsequent litigation." Id.at iJ85, see also

~

Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58,999 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 2000). The physician's
duty applies even if the communications alleged! y qualify for rule 506(d)( 1)' s exceptions
to the patient-physician privilege. Wilson, 2012 UT 43 at iJ85.
Opposing counsel has a duty in the underlying lawsuit to neither instigate nor
facilitate a treating physician's breach of the duty of confidentiality to his patient through
an improper ex parte meeting. Id. at iJ 91. After determining whether defendant acted
improperly to some degree, it is next appropriate to consider the appropriate sanction. Id.
at iJ 94. The appropriate sanction should be determined on remand by the trial court. Id.
Finally, the physician-patient privilege "includes those who are participating in the
diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician.... " Utah. R. Evid. 506
advisory committee's note (3).
There are two policy rationalizes for requiring that a plaintiffs physician provide
notice to the plaintiff before meeting ex parte with defense counsel. Id. at if87 citing
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Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2008 UT 8, ~ 12, 177 P.3d 614. First, preventing ex-parte
@

communications without prior notice would protect the patient-physician relationship by
providing the patient with "assurance that their candid responses to questions important
to determining their appropriate medical treatment would remain confidential." Id.
Second, permitting ex parte communications between a treating physician and opposing
counsel would make it impossible for a patient or a court to appropriately monitor the
scope of the physician's disclosures. Id. Monitoring the scope of the communications
between a treating physician and opposing counsel is important because an unauthorized

ex parte interview could disintegrate into a discussion of the impact of a jury's award
upon a physician's professional reputation, the rising cost of malpractice insurance
premiums, the notion that the treating physician might be the next person to be sued, and
other topics which might influence the treating physician's views.
Id.
@

The duty of counsel not to communicate with plaintiffs physicians exists because
opposing counsel has interests adverse to the patient. Id. at ~ 91.
In this case, Nurse C.W., who treated Plaintiffs pregnancy at issue, was a

@

"physician" employed by non-party hospital Moab Regional Hospital. Because plaintiff
neither gave permission nor was afforded the opportunity to be present at any meeting
between nurse C.W. and defense counsel, any discussions with defense counsel and nurse
C.W. were prohibited ex parte communications. Nevertheless, defense counsel and
Nurse C. W. had ex parte communications prior to the trial.
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The ex parte communications between Nurse C.W. and defense counsel is the
exact type of communication prohibited by Debry, Sorensen and Wilson. Defense
counsel communicated about Nurse C.W.'s testimony at the trial and Plaintiff was not
afforded the opportunity to monitor whether those discussions disintegrated into a
discussion of the impact of a jury's findings upon the physician's reputation, the rising
cost of malpractice insurance, the notion that the physician might be the next person to be
sued, and other topics which might have influenced the physician's views. It is simply
irrelevant that both Nurse C. W. and defense counsel deny any "improper"
communications during their admitted ex parte communication. Indeed, such denials

~

must be expected.
Plaintiff avers that there was great prejudice in allowing Nurse C. W. to testify
after her ex parte meeting with Dr. Williams' counsel. This prejudice is especially great
given Nurse C.W. acknowledged her 'friendship" with Dr. Williams and association with
a juror. Because it is clear that Nurse C.W.'s meeting with Defendants' counsel was

~

impermissible, the trial court should have held a hearing evaluating the totality of the ex
parte communications and considered an appropriate remedy. In accordance with the
required remedy under the applicable case law, Plaintiff requests discovery and a hearing
on remand to determine an appropriate sanction for defendant's ex parte communication
~

with Nurse C.W.
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CONCLUSION
Lee respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's decision and
remand the case for a new trial based on the erroneous Order on Defense's Motion for
Summary Judgment, the biased jurors, the inaccurate jury instructions that misled the
jury, and the exclusion of Lee's relevant medical records. Lee also requests that the
Court hold that the healthcare fiduciary duty of confidentiality applies to nurses and other
medical providers in addition to doctors, that it find defense counsel breached her duty
relative to the nurse's duty, and that it direct the trial court to consider an appropriate
sanction.
SUBMITTED this 27th day of October, 2016.

~

43
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on October 27, 2016, I caused to be sent U.S. First Class Mail,
true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief ofPlaintiff-Appellate, to the following:
€iJ

@

Catherine M. Larson
Kathleen J. Abke
STRONG & HANNI
I 02 South 200 East, Ste 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees

~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Certificate of Compliance With Rule 24(f){l)

1)

This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah App.
P.24(f){l) because this brief contains 11,809 words, excluding the parts of
the brief exempted by Utah R. App. P.24(f){l){B).

2)

This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P.27(b)
because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface
using Microsoft Word 2013 in 13 pt. Times New Roman style.

Dated: October 27, 2016

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS

Signed Verdict dated January 28, 2016, ..................................................................... Add.I
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment Dated April 21, 2015 ........................... Add. 2-6
Oral Ruling from Pretrial Conference Dated January 19, 2016 ............................... Add. 7-9
Transcript regarding Nurse C.W Voir Dire R.2721-2743 ................................... Add. 10-32
Transcript Juror K.H. R.2650-2657 .................................................................... Add. 33-40
Jury Instruction Number 28 ....................................................................................... Add. 41
Jury Instruction Number 29 ....................................................................................... Add. 42
Discharge Summary Dated January 1, 2009 ............................................................. Add. 43
@

Redacted Discharge Summary Defendants Trial Exhibit 6 ...................................... Add. 44

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of Grand County
State of Utah

KYLIE ANN BEDDOES LEE,

VERDICT
Plaintiff,

vs.

KENNETH L WILLIAMS and MOAB
FAMILY MEDICINE PC,
Defendants.

Case No. 130700019

Instructions:
As soon as six or more of you agree on the answer to the question, the foreperson should answer
the question, sign and date the verdict fonn, and tell the bailiff you have finished. The bailiff will
escort you back to this courtroom; you should bring the completed verdict form with you.
Question:
Do you find that Defendants have established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Kylie Lee
knew or sho~ve known, by September 27, 2010, that she might have suffered an injury?
Yes
No - - -

DATEDthis

~

dayofJanuary,2016

Gj
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THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KYLE ANN BEDDOES LEE, an
individual

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs

Case No. 130700019

RENNETS L. WILLIAMS , M. D . , an
individual, and MOAB FAMILY
MEDICINE, P.C., a Utah
Professional Corporation, and
JOHN DOES I-X

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

~

Defendants,

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendants Kenneth
L. Williams, M.D.,

("Williams"), and Moab Family Medicine, P.C.

is denied.
The claim of Plaintiff Kylie Ann Beddoes Lee ("Lee") that
the statute of limitations was extended because Williams
fraudulently concealed her injury is without merit.

Section

78B-3-404(2) (b), Utah Code extends the statute only when a
doctor affirmatively acts to conceal his misconduct.

Stretching

Lee's allegations to the breaking point, the most that can be
said is that Williams did not, on December 31 st , 2008, cancel the

1
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order given on December 30 th , 2008, for a RhoGAM shot.

That is

not an affirmative act.
The giving of the RhoGAM shot on December 31 st , 2008 is not
totally meaningless, however. It figures in the Court's analysis
of whether Lee knew, by March, 2009, that she might have been
injured.
The running of a statute of limitations for medical
malpractice is triggered when a patient knows a provider might
have been negligent and the negligence might have caused an
injury.

Resolving all disputed facts in Lee's favor, it is

clear she knew, by March, 2009: 1) that she should have been
given a RhoGAM shot during her first pregnancy, and 2) knew she
had not been given that shot.

Thus, she clearly knew that

Williams might have been negligent.
With respect to whether Lee knew she might have been
injured by the alleged negligence, the following facts alleged
by Lee must be taken as true:
1.

Lee knew that her blood could have developed antibodies
because she had not been given the RhoGAM shot during her
first pregnancy.

2.

Lee knew that her blood had been screened after birth.

2
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3.

Lee knew that she had been given a RhoGAM shot after her
first child was born.
Had Lee not been given the RhoGAM shot immediately

following her first delivery, the Court would be forced to
conclude that Lee knew, by March, 2009, that she might have
suffered the injury of developing Rh antibodies.

However, when

one adds the additional fact that Lee knew she had been given
the RhoGAM shot, and draws all inferences favorable to Lee from
that fact, it is possible to conclude that Lee neither knew nor
should have known that she might have developed the antibodies.
After doing her research in March, 2009, she could reasonably
have concluded:

1.

I could have developed the antibodies.

2.

If I had developed the antibodies, I would not have been
given the RhoGAM shot.

3.

I was given the RhoGAM shot.

4.

Therefore, I did not develop the antibodies.
Williams vigorously contests all of Lee's factual

contentions.

He maintains that he did instruct Lee to get a

RhoGAM shot during pregnancy, that he did not have an
opportunity to cancel the RhoGAM shot after becoming aware that
Lee had developed Rh antibodies, that he did discuss with Lee
Cw

3
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•
that she had developed Rh antibodies, and that he discussed the
risk those antibodies presented to future fetuses.

The law

requires the Court to ignore evidence favorable to him at this

•

juncture .
Since there are so many hotly contested factual iss ues
connected with the statute of limitations defense , which are
largely distinct from the other issues, the Court suggests that
the parties consider whether judicial economy would be served by
bifurcating this issue.

•

The Court has not determined that

bifurcation is warranted, but believes it should be considered.
Counsel for Lee should submit a formal order pursuant to

•
•

Rule 7, U.R .C .P . .

Dated this 21 st day of April, 2015.

•

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

•
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2009.

And at the end of that research,

she knew that, under

2

her circumstances, she should have received a RhoGAM shot

3

during her pregnancy and at the end of her pregnancy, and she

4

knew that she hadn't received a RhoGAM shot during her

5

pregnancy.
Therefore, either she knew that she had failed to

6
7

follow the doctor's instructions, or she knew that the doctor

8

had failed to give her the instructions.

9

to know the answer to that question, but it's either one or

10

And I don't presume

the other.

11

And if it's the one, she's out.

If it's the other,

12

then she knows that the doctor negligently failed to instruct

13

her to get the shot.

14

just don't - whether my order that I signed after I granted

15

and denied the motion for summary judgment says that,

16

clearly, I believed that we were narrowing the issues.

17

I was resolving that question as a matter of law.

18

That's knowledge of negligence, and I

And if I didn't do it now,

I think I have to - or

19

if I didn't do it then,

20

the state of the evidence is no different.

21

that.

22

considered then.

23

That

I think I have to do it now, because
She's admitted

Her testimony is the same, whether considered now or

So it was certainly my intent that we were narrowed

24

down to the question of not whether she knew of the

25

negligence, but the question of whether she knew that she'd
43
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1

been injured by the negligence, and I think I laid it out in

2

my ruling pretty clearly.

3

So I disagree with the argument that one cannot -

4

that one cannot know of negligence until one first knows of

5

injury.

6

example that you may know of negligence first and later find

7

out about injury.

8

think - because the language and opinions that really has to

9

do with the fact that these two things have to coincide

I think there are circumstances, and this case is an

It's rare, but not impossible, and I don't

10

before you have the legal claim really is helpful in

11

understanding the legal principles, and I don't think that

12

any of it establishes the legal principle that one cannot, as

13

a matter of law, know of negligence until one first knows of

14

injury.

15

So I think the issue we're going to be trying at

16

trial, and it's certainly my intention to contain it to that

17

is did she know or should she have known that she was injured

18

by September of 2010?

19

all of the rest of these questions, but that's to be clear.

20

That's what I want the trial to focus on.

21

of what we're trying.

22

Now, that doesn't necessarily answer

That is the core

If you want evidence to be admissible at trial, it

23

has to bear on those issues, and it has to be more useful

24

than it is un-useful.

25

So that's my plan for the trial.

Have I been unclear?
44
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1

a question by complying with the procedure outlined in this

2

instruction.
How convinced should the jury be before making

14.

3

In a civil trial the party making a claim is

4

a decision?

5

responsible to prove it.

6

call a burden or a burden of proof.

7

is responsible to prove that claim by a preponderance of the

8

evidence.

9

all the evidence presented in court, the convincing weight

This responsibility is sometime
The party making a claim

This means that after considering and comparing

10

thereof must be in favor of the party making the claim.

11

the evidence is evenly balanced or if the balance is not in

12

favor of the claimant, then the claimant has not met its

13

burden as to that claim.

14

The evidence will not be presented.

15

Mr. Larson?

16

MS. LARSON:

Yes, Your Honor, we would like to call

17

Connie Wilson and my associate is going to go outside and

18

grab her.

While she's doing that I'll turn this around.

19

CONNIE K. WILSON

20

having been first duly sworn, testified

21

upon her oath as follows:

22

MS. LARSON:

23

24
25

If

Thank you, Ms. Wilson.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. LARSON:
Q

Would you please state your full name?

196
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1

A

Connie K. Wilson.

2

Q

All right. And what is your profession?

3

A

I'm a registered nurse.

4

Q

And how long have you been a registered nurse?

5

A

This summer it will be 20 years.

6

Q

All right. And where are you employed?

7

A

At Moab Regional Hospital.

8

Q

And how long have you been employed there?

9

A

Well, at Moab Regional Hospital since they opened

10
11

12

in 2011 and then Allen Memorial Hospital since 1996.
Q

All right.

And in 2008, December of 2008 what

department were you working at Allen Memorial Hospital?

13

A

As a nurse in labor and delivery.

14

Q

And had you had occasion to work with Dr. Williams

15

in that capacity?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

How frequently over the - how many years have you

18
19

been working with Dr. Williams?
A

When he got here in Moab,

I believe that was 2000,

20

I'm trying to remember based on when my son was born, so I

21

think it would be 2000.

22

Q

Okay, close enough.

23

A

Yeah.

24

Q

So over the last 15 years then how many occasions,

25

if you can give us a rough estimate, have you had opportunity
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1

to work with Dr. Williams?

2

A

Well,

I am one of - at that time I would have been

3

one of two and a quarter nurses that took calls.

So I would

4

say, a hundred babies a year, and he probably delivered 30 of

5

them.

6

maybe a half of 30, maybe 15 times.

So I might have been with him 30 times, you know, or

7

Q

A year?

8

A

With him on actual labor and delivery patient.

9

10
11

12
13

But

we would see patients coming in and out of the hospital too,
for other reasons.
Q

And how you had occasion to observe Dr. Williams

explaining medical conditions to patients?
A

Yes.

14

MR. YOUNG:

Objection. May we approach?

15

THE COURT:

Yes.

16

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:

17

MR. YOUNG:

Judge,

if she's going to talk about

18

character evidence, this is character evidence, is that where

19

we're going?

20

MS. LARSON:

No, it's just to state his habit and

21

his custom.

22

communication and so this witness and my next witness are

23

only going to say I've had occasion to observe him

24

communicate and this is what I've observed.

25

The whole issue of this case is the issue of

MR. YOUNG:

Character -
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1

2

MS. LARSON:

So it does not go to character or

reputation at all.

3

MR. YOUNG:

4

MS. LARSON:

5

MR. YOUNG:

It sound like This is what the whole case is about.
Judge,

I also -

I have some questioning

6

I think I need to do of this witness outside the presence of

7

the jury.

8

well rehearsed with my client's treating medical provider who

9

does not work at the defendant's office.

I would like to know why Mrs. Larson is so very

I want to know if

10

Mrs. Larson was communicating with this witness outside of my

11

authority and my client's presence.

12

treating medical provider.

13

her to speak with her.

14

presence and my client's presence.

15

This is my client's

We didn't sign a release to allow

I need to know if they met outside my

Judge, there's a decision called Barbuto that's out

16

there and it's currently in litigation right now in Provo,

17

actually the Wilson v. IHC case where a guy by the name of

18

Dr. Boyer changed some of his opinions that negatively

19

affected one of his patients.

20

Court has sent down sanctions against Dr. Barbuto and they're

21

having a trial on it literally as we speak in Judge Johnson's

22

Court in the Fourth District Court on this very thing.

23

they met outside of my presence or there was any

24

communication outside of my client's presence,

25

strike the witness, Judge.

He is currently, the Supreme

If

I move to
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MS. LARSON:

1

Your Honor,

I'm going to ask her about

2

her involvement with Mrs. Lee's delivery.

3

She doesn't have any memory and nothing relevant to speak of.

4

The only reason I'm calling this witness and the next witness

5

who was also a nurse whose been deposed,

6

one or two questions of observations of Dr. Williams in

7

communicating with patients because that's the issue is

8

plaintiffs are claiming that he did not communicate with

9

them.

10

MR. YOUNG:

She was deposed.

is only to ask this

I would respond by just saying too that

11

defendants moved to exclude character evidence and the Court

12

ruled I couldn't put on character evidence and this is

13

character evidence about what he typically does, Judge -

14

MS. LARSON:

15

MR. YOUNG:

16

19
20

No - that's why I would have a hard time

with this evidence in that respect too.

17
18

MS. LARSON:
this,

-

I don't see 608 (inaudible).

I see

I think it's four THE COURT:

Let's excuse the jury and we'll
~

(inaudible).

21

MS. LARSON:

22

MR. YOUNG:

23

(End of sidebar)

24

THE COURT:

25

~

Thank you.
Thank you.

Okay, members of the jury, I need to

talk to the lawyers about this for a bit.

So,

I'm going to
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1

excuse you.

2

There are treats in the jury room,

3

you want to go.

I think it won't take more than 15 minutes.
so maybe that's the place

4

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom)

5

THE COURT:

You can be seated.

The record will

6

reflect that the court is in session outside the hearing of

7

the jury.
If you're comfortable there you can just stay right

8

9

there 'cause we may have some questions of you.

Okay?

10

I'm hearing - and I should note I don't think I

11

have the ability to make a record up here and not have it

12

broadcast throughout the courtroom.

13

ways of dealing with these conferences.

14

then make a record as we may need afterwards or we can excuse

15

the jury and do in open court to make a record.

So there will be two
We can have them and

(Inaudible).

16

CLERK:

17

THE COURT:

18

CLERK: Push that one.

19

THE COURT:

So when I push this button (inaudible)?

okay, so how do I avoid broadcasting to

20

the courtroom what we're talking about?

21

record.

Okay.

So now we can

So I ask you to do it and you can do it?

22

CLERK: I do it (inaudible}.

23

THE COURT: Okay, great.

I don't have the ability

24

but my clerk does and that's where the authority should rest.

25

Okay.
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MR. YOUNG:

1

Judge, might I ask the witness a few

2

questions since she was my client's treating medical

3

provider?

4

THE COURT: Yes.

5

MR. YOUNG:

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

6
7

BY MR. YOUNG:

8

Q

Good afternoon, Ms. Wilson.
THE COURT:

9

10

Thank you.

Actually, we're not to that yet.

You

don't' want to call her yet, do you?

11

MR. YOUNG:

Not cross examination.

12

THE COURT:

Okay, so first,

the first hurdle that

13

Ms. Larson has to get over is, is this habit evidence or is

14

it character evidence.
MR. YOUNG:

15

So you're premature.
Oh, this is about just what

16

conversations she had with Mrs. Larson so I can know about

17

that.

~

18

THE COURT:

I don't care about that yet.

19

MR. YOUNG:

Okay.

I

just wanted to make a record

20

on that and then make my objection based on what her answers

21

are to those questions.

22

THE COURT:

Fine, you can make it later.

23

MR. YOUNG:

After - do you want the jury around

24

when I do that or ...

25

THE COURT:

No, not yet.

202
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1
2

MR. YOUNG:
character - sorry.
THE COURT:

3

4

Oh, you're saying let's talk about the

Yeah,

if she's not going to testify,

why do you care?

5

MR. YOUNG:

Good point.

6

THE COURT:

Okay.

So if she's just going to

7

testify about character then it isn't coming in.

8

going to testify about habit, she can and the boundary

9

between character and habit is,

10

clearly defined.

is there but not always

So ...

MS. LARSON:

11

If she's

So Your Honor, the rule with respect

12

to character is 608 as you know, witness's character for

13

truthfulness or untruthfulness.

14

to go there.
THE COURT:

15
16
17

This witness is not intended

Or also a person's tendency to do

anything.
MS. LARSON:

Well, under 406, evidence of a

18

person's habit, routine,

19

that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance

20

with the habit or routine practice.

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. LARSON:

23

THE COURT:

24

MS. LARSON:

25

THE COURT:

or practice may be admitted to prove

So my -

Okay, that - intent with this witness Right.

You want to show habit.

I want to show habit.
Okay, but you have to get past, you
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1

have to get past character to get to habit.

2

point something we do goes beyond character and becomes

3

habit.

4

MS. LARSON:

I mean, at some

Well, but I'm not using this witness

5

to establish character for truthfulness or untruthfulness and

6

that's the 608.

7

THE COURT:

But that's not the only character trait

8

and that's not the only rule on character.

Okay.

So there's

9

character for truthfulness, there's character for violence;

10

there's character for,

11

think of can be a character trait.

12

to testify about most character traits to prove that a person

13

acted in conformity therewith.

14

a character trait to becoming a habit.

15

are different in nature but they're very similar to one

16

another and that's, that's the point.

17

foundation for this being not something that is a character

18

trait but something that is a habit or a routine.

19

MS. LARSON:

you know, any character trait you can
And we don't allow people

It has to go beyond becoming
Now, many of those

I have to have a

And my purpose of that is with the

20

questions asking this witness her, the frequency with which

21

she's had occasion to observe Dr. Williams.

22
23

THE COURT:

Okay.

So what is it - why don't you

run through it then, what you intend to show.

24

MS. LARSON:

25

THE COURT:

So do you want to ask her?
Yes, go ahead and ask her.
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1

Q

(BY MS. LARSON)

So over the 15 years that you've

2

worked at Allen Memorial Hospital, you've testified that

3

you've had 15 to 30 occasions a year to work with Dr.

4

Williams.

5

A

That would just be a guess.

I really, truly don't

6

know how many times I would call him on a phone about a

7

patient who didn't have her baby.

8

that you understand,

9

Q

No,

10

A

-

So I want to make sure

I don't have a number, but I -

you don't have a number.

if you do the math based on how often I'm on call

11

and how often he was probably on call, if it's about a

12

patient in labor, probably somewhere between

13

a year.

15 and 30 times

14

Q

It would be many?

15

A

I'm sorry?

16

Q

Would it be many?

17

A

I would agree that would be many times a year, yes.

18

Q

And would you, would it also be many times over the

19

course of 15 years that you've had occasion to be with Dr.

20

Williams when he has been explaining medical conditions to a

21

patient?

22

A

Yes, many.

23

Q

Many times?

24

MR. YOUNG:

Objection, hearsay.

25

THE COURT:

Overruled.

~
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1

Q

(BY MS. LARSON) And on those many occasions what

2

has been your observation with respect to how Dr. Williams

3

communicates medical conditions to patients, generally?
MR. YOUNG:

4

Objection, and if this is the line of

5

questioning, Judge,

I just believe that counsel is opening

6

the door to me being able to discuss with the nurse how many

7

times she's observed Dr. Williams after learning of

8

potentially being negligent.
THE COURT:

9

Okay.

MS. LARSON:

10

I guess that warning is given.

Well, and I appreciate the warning

11

because I will take that into consideration whether we

12

continue to call this witness.

13

THE COURT:

14

Q

Okay.

(BY MS. LARSON)

Let's take one step at a time.
And on those occasions where

15

you've had opportunities to be with Dr. Williams when he's

16

been explaining medical conditions to his patients, what have

17

been your observations?

18

MR. YOUNG:

Same objection, Judge.

19

THE COURT:

Same objection is hearsay?

20

MR. YOUNG:

Objection that it's just opening the

THE COURT:

You can't object that someone is

21

22
23

door.

opening a door.

~

It has to violate a rule of evidence.

24

MR. YOUNG:

Thank you.

25

THE COURT:

Same warning?

206
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1

MR. YOUNG: Yes.

2

THE COURT: Don't give the warning any more.

3

did it once, don't need to do it -

4
5

You

MR. YOUNG:

I was going to say I'll just make it a

continuing warning.

6

Q

(BY MS. LARSON)

7

A

Dr. Williams,

What has been your observations?

in my opinion is very

8

straightforward, he educates in detail and spends a lot of

9

time in the room when there's choices or new things that

10

happen in labor and delivery that he needs to explain to a

11

patient about what might happen to them.

12

detailed and very straightforward and those would be the only

13

adjectives I could use.

14
15
16

Q

If patients have had questions, what has been your

observations as to how Dr. Williams responds?
A

He would answer their questions -

17

MR. YOUNG:

18

THE WITNESS:

19

MS. LARSON:

20

THE COURT:

21

But always very

Objection, hearsay.
And spend, you know, enough time Hold on a minute.
Overruled, not offered for the truth

but offered as a statement.

22

MS. LARSON:

23

THE WITNESS:

Go ahead.
You know,

I've never been a situation

24

where he didn't answer questions that a patient had and

25

answer them in a way that was, you know, detailed, detailed.
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1

Q

(BY MS. LARSON)

In your observation what - has Dr.

2

Williams used terminology that appears to be understandable

3

to a lay person?

4

A

Yes.
MS. LARSON:

5

Your Honor, that's essentially all I

6

intended for this witness and the next one.

7

the objections this is going to open a door to negative

8

character evidence then I would like to obviously talk with

9

my client and make a decision as to whether we call the

10

If based upon

witnesses.

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

So then you would ask if she is

12

allowed to ask those questions you would ask on how many of

13

those occasions, how many times have you had a chance to

14

observe what Dr. Williams does as far as educating his

15

patient after he might have done something that was

16

negligent?

17

MR. YOUNG:

Exactly.

18

THE COURT:

And what will you say if he asks that

19
20

21

22
23
24

25

question?
THE WITNESS:

I've never been in a situation where

he's educated a patient about a negligent experience.
MR. YOUNG:

I think you stated it correctly, Judge,

so I think the question would be a little different.
THE COURT:

Yeah,

it's not - it would be and on how

many of those occasions have, let's see,

so have there been
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1

any occasions where you thought he might have been negligent

2

and you saw how he educated?
THE WITNESS:

3

Zero,

I personally have not been in

4

the room where he ever explained to a patient there was a

5

negligent THE COURT:

6

7

That's not the question either.

So a

doctor screws up -

8

THE WITNESS:

9

THE COURT:

Yes.
- maybe nurses notice it but they don't

10

come in and say, patient,

11

screwed up,

12

right?

I want to tell you your doctor

I doubt many nurses do that.

THE WITNESS:

Well,

in my career I have seen a

13

doctor go in and explain what went wrong, not Dr. Williams,

14

but in my career I have seen that,

15

what's going to happen next,

16

medical error.
THE COURT:

17
18

yes, and they explain

you know, based on there was a

I think you're still missing the point

here.

19

THE WITNESS:

20

THE COURT:

Okay,

sorry.

I am not asking you about him going in

21

and saying I screwed up, have you ever had a case where he

22

came and said I screwed up and let me tell you how I screwed

23

up,

24

where you thought in that circumstance the doctor might have

25

made a mistake but the doctor is not saying I made a mistake,

I'm sorry.

I'm asking you,

have you had any occasions
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1

necessarily, the doctor is just coming in and educating the

2

patient?

Have you seen that with Dr. Williams?

3

THE WITNESS:

4

THE COURT:

~

Can I repeat what you're asking Have you ever had a case with Dr.

5

Williams where you thought maybe he'd made a mistake and you

6

had the opportunity to observe what he did as far as

7

educating the patient?

8

THE WITNESS:

9

I've never had a case like that with

Dr. Williams.
THE COURT:

10

Okay.

I don't know what the point

11

would be of you asking that question except just to throw it

12

out there when this witness would say I've never had that.
MR. YOUNG:

13

If the inference is one of habit,

I

14

think we need to have a similar factual scenario for the

15

habit.

16

have learned that Kylie didn't get a RhoGAM shot, didn't get

17

it during the pregnancy.

18

on that day when it wasn't given to her during the pregnancy.

19

If there's some establishment of -

20

of it if it had happened several times and there had been

21

several other scenarios where Dr. Williams (inaudible) but

22

we've got a different factual scenario here where we - facts

23

that are established that Kylie did not get the RhoGAM shot

24

during the pregnancy, that was known,

25

there's no order for it in Dr. Williams' records and he would

The factual scenario here is that Dr. Williams would

So what did he explain to her then

I could see the relevance

it's not disputed,
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1

have known generally that she had built an antibody on

2

January 1, 2009 but was then faced with talking to Kylie

3

about that after knowing that there's no order for RhoGAM

4

shot in his records and she didn't get it.

5

factual scenario I think we have here that's different than

6

just regular -

7

THE COURT:

And that's the

So you're saying really we need, in

8

order to introduce habit evidence you have to have evidence

9

of a doctor's habit in a specific circumstance like this -

10

MR. YOUNG:

Yes.

11

THE COURT:

- where there is the question about

12

whether the doctor has been negligent or the patient has been

13

negligent and what does a doctor do in that circumstance?

14

MR. YOUNG:

Yes.

15

THE COURT:

So this actually goes to whether I

16

should allow it in as habit evidence because all of the habit

17

evidence she has, this witness has observed is in situations

18

where there's no question of medical negligence, right?

19

MR. YOUNG:

Yes,

I think both my objection would be

20

it sounds like character evidence to me but it also goes,

21

Mrs. Larson is introducing it saying it's a habit then I

22

would say it's not the right factual scenario.

23
24
25

if

THE COURT: Do you have anything you want to say,
Ms. Larson?
MS. LARSON:

Not that I haven't already said.
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1

think,

I don't think that habit rule requires such

2

specificity with a factual scenario that it would preclude

3

this more broad stroked type of testimony.
THE COURT:

4

Okay.

So Ms. Larson, you're saying

5

that we have established a foundation with this witness that

6

there is enough, enough repetition of this that it can be

7

called a habit?

8

MS. LARSON:

9

THE COURT:

Correct.
And Mr. Young, you're saying no, this

10

is just evidence of Dr. Williams' character for care,

11

meticulousness?

•

12

MR. YOUNG:

Yes.

13

THE COURT:

It's a character trait of being

14

Iii

meticulous?

15

MR. YOUNG:

Yes.

16

THE COURT:

And I don't suppose either of you has a

17

good case that teases out the difference between those two

18

things?

19

MS. LARSON:

20

MR. YOUNG:

21

the objection today.

22

THE COURT:

iv

I don't.
I didn't know I was going to be making

Okay.

It's a lot of instances she's

23

had,

I think it qualifies as habit, at least there's a

24

foundation for considering it as habit, so I'll allow it.

25

And then the question would be if I do then you

Page 26 - Addendum
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

212

<id

~

1

will want to ask this question that you've articulated, on

2

how many of those occasions was it a circumstance where

3

either the doctor or the patient missed something and as a

4

result the patient has had something to come back to haunt

5

them happen?

6

MS. LARSON:

7

THE COURT:

8

That's correct.
And you would say I don't know of any

such instance?

9

THE WITNESS:

10

MR. YOUNG:

Correct.
I would also like to inquire with the

11

witness there with the door being opened if I can ask that

12

question, lay a little of basis for that in he opinion, you

13

know, to get out there whether or not there was a mistake and

14

what Dr. Williams would have realized by looking at his

15

records.

16

THE COURT:

Okay.

That's just one incident.

So

17

I'm not going to allow the question even.

18

that out there without any basis to back it up.

19

to be free to argue, of course, that all the habit evidence

20

in the world where things are going great doesn't matter in a

21

situation where something has gone wrong.

22

from that how the doctor is going to act when either he or

23

the patient has been, has failed to do something that should

24

have been done.

25

ask this witness about because she doesn't have any basis for

It just throws
You're going

You don't know

But that's not going to be something you can
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1

what happens in that circumstance.
Okay.

2
3

Larson?
MS. LARSON:

4

5

Are you clear on what I've ruled, Ms.

I am clear.

At sidebar counsel made

another -

6

THE COURT:

7

MS. LARSON:

8

obviously concerned.

9

THE COURT:

Yes - statement about Barbuto which has me

Now you want to say she shouldn't be

10

allowed to testify because she's a medical provider for your

11

patient, for your client.

12
13

MR. YOUNG:

I just would like to talk with her

about that.

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

15

MR. YOUNG:

Can I

16
17
18
19

just ask her some questions

outside the presence of the jury to find out what's gone on?
THE COURT:

Okay.

But you don't plan to ask her

about the treatment of Kylie Lee at all?
MS. LARSON:

No, not at all.

So if I'm taking Mr.

20

Young's argument to, you know, the next step,

21

talk to anyone in the hospital who may have incidentally

22

treated someone -

23

I could never

I'm not asking -

THE COURT:

Right,

I don't see how you buy the

24

loyalty of a medical provider simply by hiring them.

You buy

25

their confidentiality and with respect to their treatment of

214
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1

you, you buy their confidentiality and their - nothing brings

2

to question whether they can't talk to anyone.

3

MS. LARSON:

I think that that's reading Barbuto in

4

a very skewed way because I'm not asking this witness

5

anything about her involvement in the treatment of Kylie Lee.

6

So that argument would suggest that I can't talk to anyone

7

whose had contact with any of Dr. Williams' patients.

8

THE COURT:

Right,

9

MS. LARSON:

Well,

and that's patently ridiculous.
I agree.

10

THE COURT: So what do you hope to -

11

MR. YOUNG:

For cross examination and for

12

preservation of the record I would just like to ask those

13

questions of the witness just to find out, because I haven't

14

had an opportunity (inaudible) from my client, I would like

15

to just find out what those communications were and -

16

THE COURT:

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

17
18

Okay, ask.

Q

(BY MR. LARSON)

Nurse Wilson, how did you prepare

19

with Ms. Larson or the defense to get ready for your

20

testimony here?

21

A

I was called last night and asked if I would be

22

willing to come in and talk about how Dr. Ken Williams

23

educates patients.

24

Q

Who called you?

25

A

Mrs. Larson, the attorney.
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1

Q

And how long did that phone call last?

2

A

A couple minutes.

3

Q

And did she tell you who she represented?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Who did she tell you she represented?

6

A

Dr. Ken Williams.

7

Q

And can you recall what she talked with you about?

8

A

Yes. She asked if, you know, my experience with

9

working with Dr. Williams,

if I would have been around him

10

when he educated and his style of education. And I said, yes,

11

I've been there for many years and I could answers questions

12

you had and other than she told me where to show up and that

13

I wasn't subpoenaed, it was voluntary and, you know,

14

honestly didn't know where the courthouse was so we talked

15

more about that than anything else.

I
~

16

Q

Small town, you don't know.

17

A

I know,

18

Q

Were there conversations about Kylie herself?

19

A

No.

20

Q

Kylie's care?

21

A

No.

22

Q

Nothing like that?

23

A

No.

24

Q

Did she use her name do you know?

25

A

Maybe she said in the case regarding this patient

I was like is it in this building.

Yeah.

216
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1

but I honestly can't say that for sure.

2

the name of the case but I don't remember.

3

4

Was the only time you talked to Mrs. Larson or have

you talked to her before?

5

A

I was deposed in the case, was it two years ago?

6

Q

That's fair.

7

A

And so I met her then.

8

Q

But just last night on the phone, hadn't talked to

9

10

her staff or anyone today?
A

Her staff called me today and told me to come

11

earlier. They had told me to come at 3:00 and they asked me

12

to come at 2:00 and actually left me a voice mail.

13

actually didn't get to speak directly to them.

14

two phone calls.

15
16
(w}

Q

She might have said

17

18
19
20
21

Q

I

So there's

Have you talked with Dr. Williams at all about the

case since your deposition or ...
A

No.

I mean not about the case.

I talk to him, but

I haven't talked to him about the case.
Q

Okay.

I saw you nodding before you said no, so I

was wondering ... okay, has the case been mentioned or ...
A

We haven't talked about Kylie's case.

He did

22

mention yesterday morning that he had a case today because I

23

work with him.

24
25

Q

Okay.

Last night in the conversation - first of

all, have you exchanged any emails or anything like that with
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2

counsel for the defendant?
A

She emailed me my deposition last night so I could

3

review it in case there was going to be questions on my

4

deposition.

5

Q

And what is your email address?

6

A

The one she used last night is Connie.wilson40.

7

Q

Connie.Wilson?

8

A

Forty,

9

Q

Was there a body of that email?

10

A

Yeah,

11

12
13

4 - zero@gmail.com.

I think there were something that we were

going to be called as witnesses.
Q

And has she ever text messaged you at all or any of

her staff?

14

A

No.

15

Q

And just to be clear,

I guess I asked a compound

16

question whether she had or whether her staff had.

Did - are

17

you aware of whether Kylie has signed any release to give you

18

the authority to talk with Mrs. Larson about Kylie?

19

A

No.

20

Q

Have you talked since the deposition or at all,

21

have you talked with Dr. Williams about Kylie's care, the

22

RhoGAM shot that day or anything along those lines?

23

A

No.

24

MR. YOUNG: Thank you, Judge.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

That's all I've got.

Bring the jury back in.
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1

I would do it because it's a civic duty -

2

3

THE COURT:

if we gave you

the choice you'd say no thanks?

4
5

But if you had a choice,

MR. HARMESON:

Mostly at this time 'cause I have a

lot going on in my business and stuff like that.
THE COURT:

6

But -

Why don't you tell me about that

7

because I have excused some people because it would be so

8

inconvenient for them.
MR. HARMESON:

9

Well, right now I work out at

10

Intrepid Pot Ash and I'm the production superintendent out

11

there.

12

and we haven't for a while,

so we've got a lot going on, some

13

issues there but, you know,

I've got people taking care of it

14

so it's not a thing I really need to be excused for and I

15

would serve if I needed to.

16

And we have just started actually moving some product

THE COURT:

Okay, thank you.

I'm Judge Anderson.

17

This is Catherine Larson, she's the attorney for Dr. Williams

18

and Tyler Young, the attorney for Kylie Lee.

19

jurors are going to be required to determine what they

20

believe the truth to be about something that both Dr.

21

Williams and Kylie Lee will testify about and their testimony

22

will be contradictory.

23

jurors be able to decide what they believe the truth to be

24

about that without -

25

courtroom, not including anything else and I notice you have

In this case

So it's going to be important that

just based on what they hear in the

125

Page 33 - Addendum
Gj

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~:650

1

recently been to the Moab Family Medicine?

2

MR. HARMESON: Yes.

3

THE COURT:

4

You said recently with his and I see

p-h-o?

5

MR. HARMESON: No, with his PA.

6

THE COURT:

7

was it just a one-time visit?

Okay.

8

MR. HARMESON:

9

THE COURT:

10

Would - and is that included or

It was just a one-time visit, yes.

Would you be concerned about being able

to go back there -

11

MR. HARMESON: No.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. HARMESON: No,

- if you ruled against Dr. Williams?
I don't think so.

It was a good

14

experience there.

15

care at a point and I was comfortable with that.

16
17

If we ruled against I'd still need medical

THE COURT:

And there are other places you can go

besides Moab Family Medicine, right?

18

MR. HARMESON:

19

THE COURT:

There are.

Okay.

All right.

I don't have any

20

other questions.

Well, 19, you said I do think there are too

21

many lawsuits of medical malpractice which affect costs of

22

medical insurance.

23

concern that you have and there might be quite a few people

24

in the United States that agree with you.

25

just one case, right?

That may be - that sounds like a general

However, this is
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1

MR. HARMESON: Yes.

2

THE COURT: Are you - we do not require that jurors

3

have any particular view about whether there are too many or

4

too few medical malpractice cases but we do require that they

5

decide this case based on this case's evidence and without

6

trying to correct any greater ills in the world.
MR. HARMESON: I think that's fine.

7
~

8

issue with that.
THE COURT:

9

Gj

Okay.

Ms. Larson, do you have any

10

additional questions?

11

MS. LARSON:

12

THE COURT:

Mr. Young, do you have any?

13

MR. YOUNG:

Thank you, sir.

14

~

I don't have an

know,

No,

I don't, Your Honor.

You marked that you

is is Connie Wilson?

15

MR. HARMESON: Uh-huh (affirmative).

16

MR. YOUNG:

17

And is she a Moab Family Medicine

(inaudible)?

18

MR. HARMESON: I don't know her from there.

19

her from he son was involved in a scouting program we had and

20

so that's how I know her.

21

MR. YOUNG:

22

MR. HARMESON:

23

MR. YOUNG:

24

25

I know

Met her as part of your personal life?
Uh-huh (affirmative).

Okay.

And do you know Dr. Williams

personally at all?
MR. HARMESON:

I don't know him personally although
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1

we have visited years ago, my wife went to Dr. Williams for a

2

little bit and I had recently gone into this practice but I

3

have not really personally known him.
MR. YOUNG:

4

5

I think you said if you do have medical

needs in the future you may go back to Moab -

6

MR. HARMESON:

7

MR. YOUNG:

8

I had a good experience, yes.

And Kathryn Williams, do you know her

/iv

personally?
MR. HARMESON: No, not personally.

9

10

I just know who

she is, yes.

11

MR. YOUNG:

12

MR. HARMESON: Most of my life, at least 50 years.

13

MR. YOUNG:

14

How long have you lived in Moab?

Can you tell me when you became

familiar with Kathryn and Ken Williams?
MR. HARMESON:

15

I think when they first opened their

16

practice.

17

wife needed to go to the doctor, we went and seen them.

18
19
20

My wife and I, I didn't have a procedure but my

MR. YOUNG:

So on and off it sounds like at least

since they had come to town?
MR. HARMESON:

~

Yeah, we only seen them initially

21

and then we had a different doctor at the time that we went

22

to and then recently I've had some bad experiences with some

23

medical help with a different doctor.

24

their practice.

25

~

MR. YOUNG:

So I actually went to

Was that in Moab Family Medicine?

Page 36 - Addendum
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

128

Cj

1

MR. HARMESON:

2

MR. YOUNG:

No.

And this is a medical malpractice case

3

and the Court asked you about this a little bit.

4

mind sharing your beliefs about why this is so, why you think

5

medical insurances rates,

6

because of lawsuits or costs?

it is rates, might be increased

MR. HARMESON: You know,

7

Would you

I think,

just my viewpoint

8

is that I think there are necessarily lawsuits.

I think in

9

fact in my questionnaire that my father had some situations

10

which ultimately affected him.

11

stroke and they didn't notice it and this was in Denver.

12

think we had a realistic point for a lawsuit.

13

to.

14

sometimes there's not.
MR. YOUNG:

16

MR. HARMESON:

17

THE COURT:

18

MS. LARSON:

19

THE COURT:

21
22

I

We chose not

I think sometimes there are legitimate reasons.

15

20

He went like a week with a

I think

Thank you.
Uh-huh (affirmative).

Any questions?
No.
Okay, we'll let you know in a minute.

Just wait outside, we'll let you know.
All right, you want to challenge this one for
cause, Mr. Young?

23

MR. YOUNG:

Yes, Judge.

24

THE COURT:

And it's because?

25

MR. YOUNG:

He's known the Williams family since
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1

they moved to town.

2

the clinic.

3

like he intends to go back even if he says he can be unbiased

4

I think we can determine that he would be unbiased.

5

just too close of a relationship and it sounds like they even

6

have a personal relationship between I think he said

7

scouting,

9

10

He has had some treatment at the clinic, sounds

know who she is.

That's an RN, Connie Wilson.

Medicine?
MS. LARSON:

12

THE COURT:

Okay.

13

MR. YOUNG:

She did.

She works at the hospital.

some treatment things for Kylie.
THE COURT:

Is she your witness?

16

MR. YOUNG:

No,

she's not going to testify in the

~

trial.
MS. LARSON:

18
19

~

I think she - oh, she did

15

17

I don't

Is she someone that works at Moab Family

11

14

It's

just too close THE COURT:

8

It sounds like his wife was treated at

She's our witness and she was involved

in Ms. Lee's care during the delivery of her first child.

20

MR. YOUNG:

21

MS. LARSON:

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. LARSON:

Are you going to call her?
Yes.
Ms. Larson?
Well, Your Honor,

24

Young.

25

Medicine by the PA, not by Dr. Williams.

I disagree with Mr.

This witness or juror treated once at Moab Family
He does not know
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1

them personally.

2

experience was with Connie Wilson and not with the Williams.

3

There is no relationship there that would form a strong and

4

deep seeded bias and he didn't answer any questions that

5

would even suggest that he had a bias.

6

father and himself have had issues where they felt like they

7

had a right to bring a lawsuit.

8

are necessary and some may not be necessary and that would

9

suggest that he will be impartial and weigh the evidence and

10

He said that specifically.

The scouting

In fact, his own

So he recognizes that some

rule based upon the evidence.

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

12

MR. YOUNG:

I would state an additional objection,

I -

13

based on his personal relationship with Connie Wilson if

14

she's going to be a witness.

15

don't think we took her deposition.

16

know what she has to say but, Judge, he's got a personal

17

relationship with her and knows Dr. Williams, plans on going

18

back to the clinic.

19

20

THE COURT:

I wasn't aware of that.

I

I'd be interested to

I need to challenge him for cause.
Let's bring him back in and I'll ask

him about his relationship with Connie Wilson.

21

Mr. Harmeson, would you be affected if Connie

22

Wilson testifies as a witness in this case?

23

affected by your experience with her son in the scouting

24

program?

25

MR. HARMESON:

Would you be

No.

4j

131

Page 39 - Addendum
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

000

THE COURT:

1

All right, thank you.

2

1:30.

3

convinced that he would be impartial.

Come back at

I've determined that I accept his answers and I'm

4

MR. YOUNG:

Challenge for cause.

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

6

Ms. York, come and sit right here please.

7

swear that the statements you made in your questionnaire are

8

the truth?
MS. YORK:

9

THE COURT:

10
11

Patience York is next.
Do you

Yes.
And do you swear that you'll tell us

the truth now?

12

MS. YORK:

13

THE COURT:

Yes.
Okay,

I'm Judge Anderson. This is

14

Catherine Larson, she's the attorney for Dr. Williams; and

15

this is Tyler Young, he's the attorney for Kylie Lee.

16

you for being here.

17

followup questions from the lawyers.

We just want to see if there are any

18

Do you have any, Ms. Larson?

19

MS. LARSON: Yes.

20

22

MS. LARSON:

25

~

Kathryn Williams, how do you know Dr. Kathryn Williams?
MS. YORK: She's my doctor.

24

ii

Ms. York you marked that you know

21

23

Thank

Okay, and how regularly do you see

her?
MS. YORK:

I've been there every year.

So I've

only seen her three times.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

2, (b

The issue for you to decide is whether Kylie Lee filed her claim more than two years after
she should have discovered her legal injury.
You shall consider and weigh all the evidence to determine whether Kylie Lee by the use
of reasonable diligence had actual or constructive facts by which she knew or should have kno~
prior to September 27, 20 I 0, that she might have suffered an injury.
If the greater weight of the evidence supports the defense of Dr. Williams and Moab Family
Medicine on this issue, Kylie Lee's claim against them is time barred, and your verdict is for Dr.
Williams and Moab Family Medicine. If, however, the greater weight of the evidence does not
support the defense of Dr. Williams and Moab Family Medicine on this issue9 your verdict should
be for Kylie Lee.
Gi,
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. INSTRUCTION NO.

°2-&f

"Discovery" of an injwy from medical malpractice occurs when an ordinary person

thro~gh reasonable.diligence knows or should know that she might have sustained an injury.
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ALLEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
DISCHARGE SUMMARY
PATIENT NAME:
BEDDOES, KYLIE
SEX/AGE:
Female, 19 years old
PROVIDER:

ADMITTED:

Kenneth Williams, M. D.

D.O.B.:

07/09/89

12/30/08

..J__-----o.rscmtRGED~-O"l""~

PRIMARY ADMISSION DIAGNOSES:

intrauterine pregnancy.

A 19-year-old gravida 1, para O,

term

DISCHARGE DIA.GNOSES:
1.
A 19-year-old gravida 1, now para 1, status post spontaneous
vaginal delivery.
2.
A viable 7-pound (3175 gram) male with Apgars of 9 and 9.
3.
Intact placenta with three-vessel cord.
4.
Left vaginal sidewall laceration.
5.
Postpartum anemia.
6.
Leukocytosis without stigmata of infection.
7.
Rh negative with negative fetal blood screen and fetus with
positive direct Coombs.
8.
Negative fetal blood screen with positive antibody screen .

~

i

. IAGNOSTIC STUDIES:
Discharge white count 18,000, hematocrit 25. 5,
platelets 397 ,. fetal blood screen was negative. Blood type A-, antibody
screen was positive.

SUMMARY OF HOSPITALIZATION:
Kylie is a 19-year-old gravida 1, now para
2, two days postpartum status post vaginal delivery complicated by a

left vaginal sidewall laceration.
She did well postpartum, was
breastfeeding with bottle supplement. Her lochia was scant. She was
afebrile.
She did have an impressive white count but no specific
stigmata of infection, and the white count was normalizing without
intervention. I reviewed my standard postpartum teaching. She is Rh
negative with positive antibody screen. We discussed the potential for
future miscarriages due to her positive antibody screen. She did
receive a RhoGAM.
As noted her fetal blood screen was negative. She
did miss her 26-week RhoGAM, which was quite unfortunate and despite
having been ordered. She seems to understand the potential implication
of future miscarriages.
Motrin 800 q 6 hours p.r.n., iron sulfate 325
b.i.d., prenatal vitamin l q day.
FOLLOW-UP:
She will follow up with my wife tomorrow.
She will call
for an appointment.

DISCHARGE MEDICATIONS:

1

Kenneth Williams, M.D.
/ms25DD: 01/01/09 DT:

T: 1036#388989

~ ~

~

I
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ALLEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
DISCHARGE 'SUMMA.RY

----------------· . --------- .
_ .. --PATIENT NAME:'

BED DOES ,

KYLIE

SEX/AGE: Female, 19 years old
PROVIDER: Kenneth Williams, M.D .
ADMITTED:
DISCH.IIBGED:
PRIMll.RY

D.O.B.:

07/09/89

12/30/08
01/01/09

ADMidsrON

DIAGNOSES:

intrauterine pregnancy.

A 19-year-old gravida 1, para O,

term

I

DISCHARGE DIA~OSES:
1.
A 19-yea;r-old gravida
2_.

3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

1, now para 1, status post spontaneous
vaginal delivery .
A viable _7-pound (317 5 g.rarn) male with Apgars of 9 and 9.
Intact pJJacenta with three - ve5sel cord.
Left vaginal sidewall laceration.
Postpartum anemia.
Leukocyto;sis without stigmata of infection.
Rh negative· with negative fetal blood screen and fetus with
positive airect Coombs.
Negative fetal blood screen with positive antibody screen.

Discharge white count 10,000, hematocrit 25.5,
platelets 397,; fetal blood screen was negative . Blood type A-, antibody
screen was positive
.
I

~~!AGNOSTIC STbDIES:

SUMMARY OF aodPITALIZATION: Kylie is -a 19-year-old gravida 1, now para
2, two days p;ostpartum status post vaginal delivery complicated by a

left vaginal l sidewall laceration.
She did well postpartum, was
breastfeeding ' with bottle supplement. Her lochia was scant. She was
a febrile.
Slle did have an imoressi ve white count but no specific
stigmata of ilnfection, and the· white count was normalizing without
intervention. ;r reviewed my standard .. postpartum teaching . She is Rh
negative with positive antibody screen . We discussed the potential for
f-u-t ure miscarriage.s due to her positive antibody screen . She did
receive a RhoGAM:
s ~ t a l blood screen· was negati. . .

the

~nderstand
of future miscarriages.

potential implicat..i.qn

'I

Motrin 8 00 q 6 hours p . r. n. , iron sulfate 325
b.i.d., prenat~l vitamin 1 q day.
FOLLOW-UP:
Sqe will follow llJ) with my wife tomorrow.
She will call
fo.r an appointment.
DISCHARGE MEDIPA,TIONS:

--~nneth Willia.4s., M. D.

Q
J ~tms25DD: 01/01/09
DT: 1028TD:
v,.;..,~
.

AUcn M.H.

'

oob102

OW·T:

10361388989

BcddO"..s
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